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Napoleon Bonaparte
used in War and Peace

583 uses
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?  —5 uses
exact meaning not specified
Definition
French general and emperor who ruled (through conquest) most of continental Europe for a brief time (1769-1821)
  • NAPOLEON Bonaparte's adjutant rode full gallop with this menacing letter to Murat.
    Book Two — 1805 (66% in)
  • NAPOLEON CHAPTER XIV.
    Book Three — 1805 (73% in)
  • Life meanwhile—real life, with its essential interests of health and sickness, toil and rest, and its intellectual interests in thought, science, poetry, music, love, friendship, hatred, and passions—went on as usual, independently of and apart from political friendship or enmity with Napoleon Bonaparte and from all the schemes of reconstruction.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (**% in)
  • Napoleon Bonaparte was despised by all as long as he was great, but now that he has become a wretched comedian the Emperor Francis wants to offer him his daughter in an illegal marriage.
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (4% in)
  • NAPOLEON, MOSCOW, OCTOBER 30, 1812
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (8% in)

There are no more uses of "Napoleon Bonaparte" flagged with this meaning in War and Peace.

Typical Usage  (best examples)
Dictionary / pronunciation — Google®Dictionary list — Onelook.com®Wikipedia Article
?  —578 uses
exact meaning not specified
  • Napoleon ordered an army to be raised and go to war.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (80% in)
  • It was an anecdote, then current, to the effect that the Duc d'Enghien had gone secretly to Paris to visit Mademoiselle George; that at her house he came upon Bonaparte, who also enjoyed the famous actress' favors, and that in his presence Napoleon happened to fall into one of the fainting fits to which he was subject, and was thus at the duc's mercy.
    Book One — 1805 (9% in)
  • " 'I showed them the path to glory, but they did not follow it,' " Prince Andrew continued after a short silence, again quoting Napoleon's words.
    Book One — 1805 (15% in)
  • "The execution of the Duc d'Enghien," declared Monsieur Pierre, "was a political necessity, and it seems to me that Napoleon showed greatness of soul by not fearing to take on himself the whole responsibility of that deed."
    Book One — 1805 (15% in)
  • "I say so," he continued desperately, "because the Bourbons fled from the Revolution leaving the people to anarchy, and Napoleon alone understood the Revolution and quelled it, and so for the general good, he could not stop short for the sake of one man's life."
    Book One — 1805 (15% in)
  • "No," cried he, becoming more and more eager, "Napoleon is great because he rose superior to the Revolution, suppressed its abuses, preserved all that was good in it—equality of citizenship and freedom of speech and of the press—and only for that reason did he obtain power."
    Book One — 1805 (15% in)
  • What is important are the rights of man, emancipation from prejudices, and equality of citizenship, and all these ideas Napoleon has retained in full force.
    Book One — 1805 (16% in)
  • "One must admit," continued Prince Andrew, "that Napoleon as a man was great on the bridge of Arcola, and in the hospital at Jaffa where he gave his hand to the plague-stricken; but.... but there are other acts which it is difficult to justify."
    Book One — 1805 (16% in)
  • There is a war now against Napoleon.
    Book One — 1805 (20% in)
  • But before Pierre—who at that moment imagined himself to be Napoleon in person and to have just effected the dangerous crossing of the Straits of Dover and captured London—could pronounce Pitt's sentence, he saw a well-built and handsome young officer entering his room.
    Book One — 1805 (46% in)
  • The English will come off badly, you know, if Napoleon gets across the Channel.
    Book One — 1805 (47% in)
  • "And so you think Napoleon will manage to get an army across?" asked Boris with a smile.
    Book One — 1805 (48% in)
  • Napoleon has also formed his plan by now, not worse than this one.
    Book One — 1805 (90% in)
  • But it will please our sovereign the Emperor Napoleon if we take this bridge, so let us three go and take it!'
    Book Two — 1805 (56% in)
  • The Emperor Napoleon burns with impatience to make Prince Auersperg's acquaintance.'
    Book Two — 1805 (57% in)
  • If Kutuzov decided to remain at Krems, Napoleon's army of one hundred and fifty thousand men would cut him off completely and surround his exhausted army of forty thousand, and he would find himself in the position of Mack at Ulm.
    Book Two — 1805 (64% in)
  • Our enormous forces, undoubtedly superior to Napoleon's, were concentrated in one place, the troops inspired by the Emperors' presence were eager for action.
    Book Three — 1805 (53% in)
  • It was rumored that Savary had been sent to propose to Alexander a meeting with Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (60% in)
  • To the joy and pride of the whole army, a personal interview was refused, and instead of the Sovereign, Prince Dolgorukov, the victor at Wischau, was sent with Savary to negotiate with Napoleon if, contrary to expectations, these negotiations were actuated by a real desire for peace.
    Book Three — 1805 (60% in)
  • "Yes, I saw him, and am convinced that he fears nothing so much as a general engagement," repeated Dolgorukov, evidently prizing this general conclusion which he had arrived at from his interview with Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (62% in)
  • The fires and shouting in the enemy's army were occasioned by the fact that while Napoleon's proclamation was being read to the troops the Emperor himself rode round his bivouacs.
    Book Three — 1805 (73% in)
  • Napoleon's proclamation was as follows: Soldiers!
    Book Three — 1805 (73% in)
  • The fog lay unbroken like a sea down below, but higher up at the village of Schlappanitz where Napoleon stood with his marshals around him, it was quite light.
    Book Three — 1805 (77% in)
  • The whole French army, and even Napoleon himself with his staff, were not on the far side of the streams and hollows of Sokolnitz and Schlappanitz beyond which we intended to take up our position and begin the action, but were on this side, so close to our own forces that Napoleon with the naked eye could distinguish a mounted man from one on foot.
    Book Three — 1805 (77% in)
  • The whole French army, and even Napoleon himself with his staff, were not on the far side of the streams and hollows of Sokolnitz and Schlappanitz beyond which we intended to take up our position and begin the action, but were on this side, so close to our own forces that Napoleon with the naked eye could distinguish a mounted man from one on foot.
    Book Three — 1805 (77% in)
  • Napoleon, in the blue cloak which he had worn on his Italian campaign, sat on his small gray Arab horse a little in front of his marshals.
    Book Three — 1805 (77% in)
  • It was Napoleon accompanied by two aides-de-camp.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • "Fine men!" remarked Napoleon, looking at a dead Russian grenadier, who, with his face buried in the ground and a blackened nape, lay on his stomach with an already stiffened arm flung wide.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • "Have some brought from the reserve," said Napoleon, and having gone on a few steps he stopped before Prince Andrew, who lay on his back with the flagstaff that had been dropped beside him.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • "That's a fine death!" said Napoleon as he gazed at Bolkonski.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • Prince Andrew understood that this was said of him and that it was Napoleon who said it.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • He knew it was Napoleon—his hero—but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant creature compared with what was passing now between himself and that lofty infinite sky with the clouds flying over it.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • He knew it was Napoleon—his hero—but at that moment Napoleon seemed to him such a small, insignificant creature compared with what was passing now between himself and that lofty infinite sky with the clouds flying over it.
    Book Three — 1805 (97% in)
  • He is alive," said Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • Having said this, Napoleon rode on to meet Marshal Lannes, who, hat in hand, rode up smiling to the Emperor to congratulate him on the victory.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • "You are the commander of the Emperor Alexander's regiment of Horse Guards?" asked Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • "Your regiment fulfilled its duty honorably," said Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • "I bestow it with pleasure," said Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • After looking at him Napoleon smiled.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • "A splendid reply!" said Napoleon.
    Book Three — 1805 (98% in)
  • Napoleon apparently remembered seeing him on the battlefield and, addressing him, again used the epithet "young man" that was connected in his memory with Prince Andrew.
    Book Three — 1805 (99% in)
  • Though five minutes before, Prince Andrew had been able to say a few words to the soldiers who were carrying him, now with his eyes fixed straight on Napoleon, he was silent....
    Book Three — 1805 (99% in)
  • So insignificant at that moment seemed to him all the interests that engrossed Napoleon, so mean did his hero himself with his paltry vanity and joy in victory appear, compared to the lofty, equitable, and kindly sky which he had seen and understood, that he could not answer him.
    Book Three — 1805 (99% in)
  • Looking into Napoleon's eyes Prince Andrew thought of the insignificance of greatness, the unimportance of life which no one could understand, and the still greater unimportance of death, the meaning of which no one alive could understand or explain.
    Book Three — 1805 (99% in)
  • Visions of his father, wife, sister, and future son, and the tenderness he had felt the night before the battle, the figure of the insignificant little Napoleon, and above all this the lofty sky, formed the chief subjects of his delirious fancies.
    Book Three — 1805 (**% in)
  • He was already enjoying that happiness when that little Napoleon had suddenly appeared with his unsympathizing look of shortsighted delight at the misery of others, and doubts and torments had followed, and only the heavens promised peace.
    Book Three — 1805 (**% in)
  • Toward morning all these dreams melted and merged into the chaos and darkness of unconciousness and oblivion which in the opinion of Napoleon's doctor, Larrey, was much more likely to end in death than in convalescence.
    Book Three — 1805 (**% in)
  • E'en fortunate Napoleon Knows by experience, now, Bagration, And dare not Herculean Russians trouble....
    Book Four — 1806 (27% in)
  • In the autumn of 1806 everybody had again begun talking of the war with Napoleon with even greater warmth than the year before.
    Book Four — 1806 (70% in)
  • Toward the end of 1806, when all the sad details of Napoleon's destruction of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt and the surrender of most of the Prussian fortresses had been received, when our troops had already entered Prussia and our second war with Napoleon was beginning, Anna Pavlovna gave one of her soirees.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (26% in)
  • Toward the end of 1806, when all the sad details of Napoleon's destruction of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt and the surrender of most of the Prussian fortresses had been received, when our troops had already entered Prussia and our second war with Napoleon was beginning, Anna Pavlovna gave one of her soirees.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (26% in)
  • "I should like to see the great man," he said, alluding to Napoleon, whom hitherto he, like everyone else, had always called Buonaparte.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • "I am speaking, Prince, of the Emperor Napoleon," he replied.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • He saw the raft, decorated with monograms, saw Napoleon pass before the French Guards on the farther bank of the river, saw the pensive face of the Emperor Alexander as he sat in silence in a tavern on the bank of the Niemen awaiting Napoleon's arrival, saw both Emperors get into boats, and saw how Napoleon—reaching the raft first—stepped quickly forward to meet Alexander and held out his hand to him, and how they both retired into the pavilion.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • He saw the raft, decorated with monograms, saw Napoleon pass before the French Guards on the farther bank of the river, saw the pensive face of the Emperor Alexander as he sat in silence in a tavern on the bank of the Niemen awaiting Napoleon's arrival, saw both Emperors get into boats, and saw how Napoleon—reaching the raft first—stepped quickly forward to meet Alexander and held out his hand to him, and how they both retired into the pavilion.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • He saw the raft, decorated with monograms, saw Napoleon pass before the French Guards on the farther bank of the river, saw the pensive face of the Emperor Alexander as he sat in silence in a tavern on the bank of the Niemen awaiting Napoleon's arrival, saw both Emperors get into boats, and saw how Napoleon—reaching the raft first—stepped quickly forward to meet Alexander and held out his hand to him, and how they both retired into the pavilion.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • At the time of the meeting at Tilsit he asked the names of those who had come with Napoleon and about the uniforms they wore, and listened attentively to words spoken by important personages.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (86% in)
  • The guest of honor was an aide-de-camp of Napoleon's, there were also several French officers of the Guard, and a page of Napoleon's, a young lad of an old aristocratic French family.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (87% in)
  • The guest of honor was an aide-de-camp of Napoleon's, there were also several French officers of the Guard, and a page of Napoleon's, a young lad of an old aristocratic French family.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (87% in)
  • Rostov, in common with the whole army from which he came, was far from having experienced the change of feeling toward Napoleon and the French—who from being foes had suddenly become friends—that had taken place at headquarters and in Boris.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (87% in)
  • Only recently, talking with one of Platov's Cossack officers, Rostov had argued that if Napoleon were taken prisoner he would be treated not as a sovereign, but as a criminal.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (87% in)
  • The Emperors exchanged decorations: Alexander received the Cross of the Legion of Honor and Napoleon the Order of St. Andrew of the First Degree, and a dinner had been arranged for the evening, given by a battalion of the French Guards to the Preobrazhensk battalion.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (90% in)
  • As the Tsar rode up to one flank of the battalions, which presented arms, another group of horsemen galloped up to the opposite flank, and at the head of them Rostov recognized Napoleon.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (94% in)
  • On approaching Alexander he raised his hat, and as he did so, Rostov, with his cavalryman's eye, could not help noticing that Napoleon did not sit well or firmly in the saddle.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • Napoleon said something to Alexander, and both Emperors dismounted and took each other's hands.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • Napoleon's face wore an unpleasant and artificial smile.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • Alexander and Napoleon, with the long train of their suites, approached the right flank of the Preobrazhensk battalion and came straight up to the crowd standing there.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • This was said by the undersized Napoleon, looking up straight into Alexander's eyes.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • "To him who has borne himself most bravely in this last war," added Napoleon, accentuating each syllable, as with a composure and assurance exasperating to Rostov, he ran his eyes over the Russian ranks drawn up before him, who all presented arms with their eyes fixed on their Emperor.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (95% in)
  • Napoleon slightly turned his head, and put his plump little hand out behind him as if to take something.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (96% in)
  • Napoleon, without looking, pressed two fingers together and the badge was between them.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (96% in)
  • It was as if Napoleon knew that it was only necessary for his hand to deign to touch that soldier's breast for the soldier to be forever happy, rewarded, and distinguished from everyone else in the world.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (96% in)
  • Napoleon merely laid the cross on Lazarev's breast and, dropping his hand, turned toward Alexander as though sure that the cross would adhere there.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (96% in)
  • "The day before yesterday it was 'Napoleon, France, bravoure'; yesterday, 'Alexandre, Russie, grandeur.'
    Book Five — 1806-07 (97% in)
  • One day our Emperor gives it and next day Napoleon.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (97% in)
  • They said that had we held out a little longer Napoleon would have been done for, as his troops had neither provisions nor ammunition.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (98% in)
  • In 1808 the Emperor Alexander went to Erfurt for a fresh interview with the Emperor Napoleon, and in the upper circles of Petersburg there was much talk of the grandeur of this important meeting.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (99% in)
  • In 1809 the intimacy between "the world's two arbiters," as Napoleon and Alexander were called, was such that when Napoleon declared war on Austria a Russian corps crossed the frontier to co-operate with our old enemy Bonaparte against our old ally the Emperor of Austria, and in court circles the possibility of marriage between Napoleon and one of Alexander's sisters was spoken of.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (**% in)
  • In 1809 the intimacy between "the world's two arbiters," as Napoleon and Alexander were called, was such that when Napoleon declared war on Austria a Russian corps crossed the frontier to co-operate with our old enemy Bonaparte against our old ally the Emperor of Austria, and in court circles the possibility of marriage between Napoleon and one of Alexander's sisters was spoken of.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (**% in)
  • In 1809 the intimacy between "the world's two arbiters," as Napoleon and Alexander were called, was such that when Napoleon declared war on Austria a Russian corps crossed the frontier to co-operate with our old enemy Bonaparte against our old ally the Emperor of Austria, and in court circles the possibility of marriage between Napoleon and one of Alexander's sisters was spoken of.
    Book Five — 1806-07 (**% in)
  • This was Speranski, Secretary of State, reporter to the Emperor and his companion at Erfurt, where he had more than once met and talked with Napoleon.
    Book Six — 1808-10 (15% in)
  • "An institution upholding honor, the source of emulation, is one similar to the Legion d'honneur of the great Emperor Napoleon, not harmful but helpful to the success of the service, but not a class or court privilege."
    Book Six — 1808-10 (18% in)
  • At Speranski's request he took the first part of the Civil Code that was being drawn up and, with the aid of the Code Napoleon and the Institutes of Justinian, he worked at formulating the section on Personal Rights.
    Book Six — 1808-10 (21% in)
  • Napoleon himself had noticed her in the theater and said of her: "C'est un superbe animal."
    Book Six — 1808-10 (31% in)
  • In the midst of a conversation that was started about Napoleon's Spanish affairs, which they all agreed in approving, Prince Andrew began to express a contrary opinion.
    Book Six — 1808-10 (67% in)
  • Had he not at one time longed with all his heart to establish a republic in Russia; then himself to be a Napoleon; then to be a philosopher; and then a strategist and the conqueror of Napoleon?
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (2% in)
  • Had he not at one time longed with all his heart to establish a republic in Russia; then himself to be a Napoleon; then to be a philosopher; and then a strategist and the conqueror of Napoleon?
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (2% in)
  • At dinner the talk turned on the latest political news: Napoleon's seizure of the Duke of Oldenburg's territory, and the Russian Note, hostile to Napoleon, which had been sent to all the European courts.
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (14% in)
  • At dinner the talk turned on the latest political news: Napoleon's seizure of the Duke of Oldenburg's territory, and the Russian Note, hostile to Napoleon, which had been sent to all the European courts.
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (14% in)
  • "If there were treason, or proofs of secret relations with Napoleon, they would have been made public," he said with warmth and haste.
    Book Eight — 1811-12 (94% in)
  • The historians tell us with naive assurance that its causes were the wrongs inflicted on the Duke of Oldenburg, the nonobservance of the Continental System, the ambition of Napoleon, the firmness of Alexander, the mistakes of the diplomatists, and so on.
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • Consequently, it would only have been necessary for Metternich, Rumyantsev, or Talleyrand, between a levee and an evening party, to have taken proper pains and written a more adroit note, or for Napoleon to have written to Alexander: "My respected Brother, I consent to restore the duchy to the Duke of Oldenburg"—and there would have been no war.
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • It naturally seemed to Napoleon that the war was caused by England's intrigues (as in fact he said on the island of St. Helena).
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • It naturally seemed to members of the English Parliament that the cause of the war was Napoleon's ambition; to the Duke of Oldenburg, that the cause of the war was the violence done to him; to businessmen that the cause of the war was the Continental System which was ruining Europe; to the generals and old soldiers that the chief reason for the war was the necessity of giving them employment; to the legitimists of that day that it was the need of re-establishing les bons principes, and...
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • ...was the Continental System which was ruining Europe; to the generals and old soldiers that the chief reason for the war was the necessity of giving them employment; to the legitimists of that day that it was the need of re-establishing les bons principes, and to the diplomatists of that time that it all resulted from the fact that the alliance between Russia and Austria in 1809 had not been sufficiently well concealed from Napoleon, and from the awkward wording of Memorandum No. 178.
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • To us it is incomprehensible that millions of Christian men killed and tortured each other either because Napoleon was ambitious or Alexander was firm, or because England's policy was astute or the Duke of Oldenburg wronged.
    Book Nine — 1812 (1% in)
  • To us, the wish or objection of this or that French corporal to serve a second term appears as much a cause as Napoleon's refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula and to restore the duchy of Oldenburg; for had he not wished to serve, and had a second, a third, and a thousandth corporal and private also refused, there would have been so many less men in Napoleon's army and the war could not have occurred.
    Book Nine — 1812 (2% in)
  • To us, the wish or objection of this or that French corporal to serve a second term appears as much a cause as Napoleon's refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula and to restore the duchy of Oldenburg; for had he not wished to serve, and had a second, a third, and a thousandth corporal and private also refused, there would have been so many less men in Napoleon's army and the war could not have occurred.
    Book Nine — 1812 (2% in)
  • Had Napoleon not taken offense at the demand that he should withdraw beyond the Vistula, and not ordered his troops to advance, there would have been no war; but had all his sergeants objected to serving a second term then also there could have been no war.
    Book Nine — 1812 (2% in)
  • The actions of Napoleon and Alexander, on whose words the event seemed to hang, were as little voluntary as the actions of any soldier who was drawn into the campaign by lot or by conscription.
    Book Nine — 1812 (2% in)
  • This could not be otherwise, for in order that the will of Napoleon and Alexander (on whom the event seemed to depend) should be carried out, the concurrence of innumerable circumstances was needed without any one of which the event could not have taken place.
    Book Nine — 1812 (3% in)
  • Though Napoleon at that time, in 1812, was more convinced than ever that it depended on him, verser (ou ne pas verser) le sang de ses peuples *—as Alexander expressed it in the last letter he wrote him—he had never been so much in the grip of inevitable laws, which compelled him, while thinking that he was acting on his own volition, to perform for the hive life—that is to say, for history—whatever had to be performed.
    Book Nine — 1812 (3% in)
  • ...thousands of minute causes fitted in and co-ordinated to produce that movement and war: reproaches for the nonobservance of the Continental System, the Duke of Oldenburg's wrongs, the movement of troops into Prussia—undertaken (as it seemed to Napoleon) only for the purpose of securing an armed peace, the French Emperor's love and habit of war coinciding with his people's inclinations, allurement by the grandeur of the preparations, and the expenditure on those preparations and the...
    Book Nine — 1812 (4% in)
  • Equally right or wrong is he who says that Napoleon went to Moscow because he wanted to, and perished because Alexander desired his destruction, and he who says that an undermined hill weighing a million tons fell because the last navvy struck it for the last time with his mattock.
    Book Nine — 1812 (4% in)
  • On the twenty-ninth of May Napoleon left Dresden, where he had spent three weeks surrounded by a court that included princes, dukes, kings, and even an emperor.
    Book Nine — 1812 (5% in)
  • Before leaving, Napoleon showed favor to the emperor, kings, and princes who had deserved it, reprimanded the kings and princes with whom he was dissatisfied, presented pearls and diamonds of his own—that is, which he had taken from other kings—to the Empress of Austria, and having, as his historian tells us, tenderly embraced the Empress Marie Louise—who regarded him as her husband, though he had left another wife in Paris—left her grieved by the parting which she seemed hardly able...
    Book Nine — 1812 (5% in)
  • Though the diplomatists still firmly believed in the possibility of peace and worked zealously to that end, and though the Emperor Napoleon himself wrote a letter to Alexander, calling him Monsieur mon frere, and sincerely assured him that he did not want war and would always love and honor him—yet he set off to join his army, and at every station gave fresh orders to accelerate the movement of his troops from west to east.
    Book Nine — 1812 (5% in)
  • Seeing, on the other side, some Cossacks (les Cosaques) and the wide-spreading steppes in the midst of which lay the holy city of Moscow (Moscou, la ville sainte), the capital of a realm such as the Scythia into which Alexander the Great had marched—Napoleon unexpectedly, and contrary alike to strategic and diplomatic considerations, ordered an advance, and the next day his army began to cross the Niemen.
    Book Nine — 1812 (6% in)
  • On the thirteenth of June a rather small, thoroughbred Arab horse was brought to Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (7% in)
  • Napoleon looked up and down the river, dismounted, and sat down on a log that lay on the bank.
    Book Nine — 1812 (7% in)
  • And as soon as they had got out, in their soaked and streaming clothes, they shouted "Vivat!" and looked ecstatically at the spot where Napoleon had been but where he no longer was and at that moment considered themselves happy.
    Book Nine — 1812 (8% in)
  • That evening, between issuing one order that the forged Russian paper money prepared for use in Russia should be delivered as quickly as possible and another that a Saxon should be shot, on whom a letter containing information about the orders to the French army had been found, Napoleon also gave instructions that the Polish colonel who had needlessly plunged into the river should be enrolled in the Legion d'honneur of which Napoleon was himself the head.
    Book Nine — 1812 (9% in)
  • That evening, between issuing one order that the forged Russian paper money prepared for use in Russia should be delivered as quickly as possible and another that a Saxon should be shot, on whom a letter containing information about the orders to the French army had been found, Napoleon also gave instructions that the Polish colonel who had needlessly plunged into the river should be enrolled in the Legion d'honneur of which Napoleon was himself the head.
    Book Nine — 1812 (9% in)
  • The very day that Napoleon issued the order to cross the Niemen, and his vanguard, driving off the Cossacks, crossed the Russian frontier, Alexander spent the evening at the entertainment given by his aides-de-camp at Bennigsen's country house.
    Book Nine — 1812 (9% in)
  • Next day the following letter was sent to Napoleon: Monsieur mon frere, Yesterday I learned that, despite the loyalty with which I have kept my engagements with Your Majesty, your troops have crossed the Russian frontier, and I have this moment received from Petersburg a note, in which Count Lauriston informs me, as a reason for this aggression, that Your Majesty has considered yourself to be in a state of war with me from the time Prince Kuragin asked for his passports.
    Book Nine — 1812 (12% in)
  • At two in the morning of the fourteenth of June, the Emperor, having sent for Balashev and read him his letter to Napoleon, ordered him to take it and hand it personally to the French Emperor.
    Book Nine — 1812 (13% in)
  • When dispatching Balashev, the Emperor repeated to him the words that he would not make peace so long as a single armed enemy remained on Russian soil and told him to transmit those words to Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (13% in)
  • Alexander did not insert them in his letter to Napoleon, because with his characteristic tact he felt it would be injudicious to use them at a moment when a last attempt at reconciliation was being made, but he definitely instructed Balashev to repeat them personally to Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (13% in)
  • Alexander did not insert them in his letter to Napoleon, because with his characteristic tact he felt it would be injudicious to use them at a moment when a last attempt at reconciliation was being made, but he definitely instructed Balashev to repeat them personally to Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (13% in)
  • But though he firmly believed himself to be King of Naples and pitied the grief felt by the subjects he was abandoning, latterly, after he had been ordered to return to military service—and especially since his last interview with Napoleon in Danzig, when his august brother-in-law had told him: "I made you King that you should reign in my way, but not in yours!
    Book Nine — 1812 (15% in)
  • He referred to the fact that the Emperor Napoleon had resented the demand that he should withdraw his troops from Prussia, especially when that demand became generally known and the dignity of France was thereby offended.
    Book Nine — 1812 (16% in)
  • Balashev told him why he considered Napoleon to be the originator of the war.
    Book Nine — 1812 (16% in)
  • Balashev rode on, supposing from Murat's words that he would very soon be brought before Napoleon himself.
    Book Nine — 1812 (16% in)
  • Davout was to Napoleon what Arakcheev was to Alexander—though not a coward like Arakcheev, he was as precise, as cruel, and as unable to express his devotion to his monarch except by cruelty.
    Book Nine — 1812 (17% in)
  • Thinking he could have been received in such a manner only because Davout did not know that he was adjutant general to the Emperor Alexander and even his envoy to Napoleon, Balashev hastened to inform him of his rank and mission.
    Book Nine — 1812 (18% in)
  • Next day the imperial gentleman-in-waiting, the Comte de Turenne, came to Balashev and informed him of the Emperor Napoleon's wish to honor him with an audience.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • Four days before, sentinels of the Preobrazhensk regiment had stood in front of the house to which Balashev was conducted, and now two French grenadiers stood there in blue uniforms unfastened in front and with shaggy caps on their heads, and an escort of hussars and Uhlans and a brilliant suite of aides-de-camp, pages, and generals, who were waiting for Napoleon to come out, were standing at the porch, round his saddle horse and his Mameluke, Rustan.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • Napoleon received Balashev in the very house in Vilna from which Alexander had dispatched him on his mission.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • Though Balashev was used to imperial pomp, he was amazed at the luxury and magnificence of Napoleon's court.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • Duroc said that Napoleon would receive the Russian general before going for his ride.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • He heard hurried footsteps beyond the door, both halves of it were opened rapidly; all was silent and then from the study the sound was heard of other steps, firm and resolute—they were those of Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (19% in)
  • When Napoleon, having finished speaking, looked inquiringly at the Russian envoy, Balashev began a speech he had prepared long before: "Sire!
    Book Nine — 1812 (20% in)
  • Napoleon seemed to say, as with a scarcely perceptible smile he looked at Balashev's uniform and sword.
    Book Nine — 1812 (20% in)
  • "Not yet!" interposed Napoleon, and, as if fearing to give vent to his feelings, he frowned and nodded slightly as a sign that Balashev might proceed.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • Here Balashev hesitated: he remembered the words the Emperor Alexander had not written in his letter, but had specially inserted in the rescript to Saltykov and had told Balashev to repeat to Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • Napoleon noticed Balashev's embarrassment when uttering these last words; his face twitched and the calf of his left leg began to quiver rhythmically.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • During the speech that followed, Balashev, who more than once lowered his eyes, involuntarily noticed the quivering of Napoleon's left leg which increased the more Napoleon raised his voice.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • During the speech that followed, Balashev, who more than once lowered his eyes, involuntarily noticed the quivering of Napoleon's left leg which increased the more Napoleon raised his voice.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • "The Niemen?" repeated Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • "So now you want me to retire beyond the Niemen—only the Niemen?" repeated Napoleon, looking straight at Balashev.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • Napoleon turned quickly and began to pace the room.
    Book Nine — 1812 (21% in)
  • This quivering of his left leg was a thing Napoleon was conscious of.
    Book Nine — 1812 (22% in)
  • Napoleon almost screamed, quite to his own surprise.
    Book Nine — 1812 (22% in)
  • But Napoleon did not let him speak.
    Book Nine — 1812 (22% in)
  • Catherine the Great could not have done more," said Napoleon, growing more and more excited as he paced up and down the room, repeating to Balashev almost the very words he had used to Alexander himself at Tilsit.
    Book Nine — 1812 (23% in)
  • "What could he wish or look for that he would not have obtained through my friendship?" demanded Napoleon, shrugging his shoulders in perplexity.
    Book Nine — 1812 (23% in)
  • Granted that were they competent they might be made use of," continued Napoleon—hardly able to keep pace in words with the rush of thoughts that incessantly sprang up, proving how right and strong he was (in his perception the two were one and the same)—"but they are not even that!
    Book Nine — 1812 (23% in)
  • A sovereign should not be with the army unless he is a general!" said Napoleon, evidently uttering these words as a direct challenge to the Emperor.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Napoleon interrupted him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • I give you my word of honor," said Napoleon, forgetting that his word of honor could carry no weight—"I give you my word of honor that I have five hundred and thirty thousand men this side of the Vistula.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Napoleon grinned maliciously and again raised his snuffbox to his nose.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Balashev knew how to reply to each of Napoleon's remarks, and would have done so; he continually made the gesture of a man wishing to say something, but Napoleon always interrupted him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Balashev knew how to reply to each of Napoleon's remarks, and would have done so; he continually made the gesture of a man wishing to say something, but Napoleon always interrupted him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • To the alleged insanity of the Swedes, Balashev wished to reply that when Russia is on her side Sweden is practically an island: but Napoleon gave an angry exclamation to drown his voice.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Napoleon was in that state of irritability in which a man has to talk, talk, and talk, merely to convince himself that he is in the right.
    Book Nine — 1812 (24% in)
  • Balashev began to feel uncomfortable: as envoy he feared to demean his dignity and felt the necessity of replying; but, as a man, he shrank before the transport of groundless wrath that had evidently seized Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • He knew that none of the words now uttered by Napoleon had any significance, and that Napoleon himself would be ashamed of them when he came to his senses.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • He knew that none of the words now uttered by Napoleon had any significance, and that Napoleon himself would be ashamed of them when he came to his senses.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • Balashev stood with downcast eyes, looking at the movements of Napoleon's stout legs and trying to avoid meeting his eyes.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • "But what do I care about your allies?" said Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • And probably still more perturbed by the fact that he had uttered this obvious falsehood, and that Balashev still stood silently before him in the same attitude of submission to fate, Napoleon abruptly turned round, drew close to Balashev's face, and, gesticulating rapidly and energetically with his white hands, almost shouted: "Know that if you stir up Prussia against me, I'll wipe it off the map of Europe!" he declared, his face pale and distorted by anger, and he struck one of his...
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • Napoleon was silent, still looking derisively at him and evidently not listening to him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (25% in)
  • Napoleon nodded condescendingly, as if to say, "I know it's your duty to say that, but you don't believe it yourself.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • When Balashev had ended, Napoleon again took out his snuffbox, sniffed at it, and stamped his foot twice on the floor as a signal.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • Napoleon, without giving them a glance, turned to Balashev: "Assure the Emperor Alexander from me," said he, taking his hat, "that I am as devoted to him as before: I know him thoroughly and very highly esteem his lofty qualities.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • And Napoleon went quickly to the door.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • After all that Napoleon had said to him—those bursts of anger and the last dryly spoken words: "I will detain you no longer, General; you shall receive my letter," Balashev felt convinced that Napoleon would not wish to see him, and would even avoid another meeting with him—an insulted envoy—especially as he had witnessed his unseemly anger.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • After all that Napoleon had said to him—those bursts of anger and the last dryly spoken words: "I will detain you no longer, General; you shall receive my letter," Balashev felt convinced that Napoleon would not wish to see him, and would even avoid another meeting with him—an insulted envoy—especially as he had witnessed his unseemly anger.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • Napoleon met Balashev cheerfully and amiably.
    Book Nine — 1812 (26% in)
  • At dinner, having placed Balashev beside him, Napoleon not only treated him amiably but behaved as if Balashev were one of his own courtiers, one of those who sympathized with his plans and ought to rejoice at his success.
    Book Nine — 1812 (27% in)
  • "But a large number of monasteries and churches is always a sign of the backwardness of a people," said Napoleon, turning to Caulaincourt for appreciation of this remark.
    Book Nine — 1812 (27% in)
  • "But nowhere in Europe is there anything like that," said Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (27% in)
  • This reply of Balashev's, which hinted at the recent defeats of the French in Spain, was much appreciated when he related it at Alexander's court, but it was not much appreciated at Napoleon's dinner, where it passed unnoticed.
    Book Nine — 1812 (27% in)
  • So little was his rejoinder appreciated that Napoleon did not notice it at all and naively asked Balashev through what towns the direct road from there to Moscow passed.
    Book Nine — 1812 (27% in)
  • After dinner they went to drink coffee in Napoleon's study, which four days previously had been that of the Emperor Alexander.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Napoleon sat down, toying with his Sevres coffee cup, and motioned Balashev to a chair beside him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Napoleon was in that well-known after-dinner mood which, more than any reasoned cause, makes a man contented with himself and disposed to consider everyone his friend.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Napoleon turned to him with a pleasant, though slightly ironic, smile.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Strange, isn't it, General?" he said, evidently not doubting that this remark would be agreeable to his hearer since it went to prove his, Napoleon's, superiority to Alexander.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Four days ago in this room, Wintzingerode and Stein were deliberating," continued Napoleon with the same derisive and self-confident smile.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • "And let him know that I will do so!" said Napoleon, rising and pushing his cup away with his hand.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Napoleon did not notice this expression; he treated Balashev not as an envoy from his enemy, but as a man now fully devoted to him and who must rejoice at his former master's humiliation.
    Book Nine — 1812 (28% in)
  • Again Napoleon brought out his snuffbox, paced several times up and down the room in silence, and then, suddenly and unexpectedly, went up to Balashev and with a slight smile, as confidently, quickly, and simply as if he were doing something not merely important but pleasing to Balashev, he raised his hand to the forty-year-old Russian general's face and, taking him by the ear, pulled it gently, smiling with his lips only.
    Book Nine — 1812 (29% in)
  • "Well, adorer and courtier of the Emperor Alexander, why don't you say anything?" said he, as if it was ridiculous, in his presence, to be the adorer and courtier of anyone but himself, Napoleon.
    Book Nine — 1812 (29% in)
  • The letter taken by Balashev was the last Napoleon sent to Alexander.
    Book Nine — 1812 (29% in)
  • In the year 1812, when news of the war with Napoleon reached Bucharest—where Kutuzov had been living for two months, passing his days and nights with a Wallachian woman—Prince Andrew asked Kutuzov to transfer him to the Western Army.
    Book Nine — 1812 (31% in)
  • Armfeldt virulently hated Napoleon and was a general full of self-confidence, a quality that always influenced Alexander.
    Book Nine — 1812 (38% in)
  • The adjutants general were there because they always accompanied the Emperor, and lastly and chiefly Pfuel was there because he had drawn up the plan of campaign against Napoleon and, having induced Alexander to believe in the efficacy of that plan, was directing the whole business of the war.
    Book Nine — 1812 (38% in)
  • They feared Napoleon, recognized his strength and their own weakness, and frankly said so.
    Book Nine — 1812 (40% in)
  • What is wanted is not some Barclay or other, but a man like Bennigsen, who made his mark in 1807, and to whom Napoleon himself did justice—a man whose authority would be willingly recognized, and Bennigsen is the only such man.
    Book Nine — 1812 (40% in)
  • News was received at the Emperor's quarters that very day of a fresh movement by Napoleon which might endanger the army—news subsequently found to be false.
    Book Nine — 1812 (43% in)
  • And that morning Colonel Michaud had ridden round the Drissa fortifications with the Emperor and had pointed out to him that this fortified camp constructed by Pfuel, and till then considered a chef-d'oeuvre of tactical science which would ensure Napoleon's destruction, was an absurdity, threatening the destruction of the Russian army.
    Book Nine — 1812 (43% in)
  • To this semicouncil had been invited the Swedish General Armfeldt, Adjutant General Wolzogen, Wintzingerode (whom Napoleon had referred to as a renegade French subject), Michaud, Toll, Count Stein who was not a military man at all, and Pfuel himself, who, as Prince Andrew had heard, was the mainspring of the whole affair.
    Book Nine — 1812 (44% in)
  • Besides this, the remarks of all except Pfuel had one common trait that had not been noticeable at the council of war in 1805: there was now a panic fear of Napoleon's genius, which, though concealed, was noticeable in every rejoinder.
    Book Nine — 1812 (50% in)
  • Everything was assumed to be possible for Napoleon, they expected him from every side, and invoked his terrible name to shatter each other's proposals.
    Book Nine — 1812 (50% in)
  • Pfuel alone seemed to consider Napoleon a barbarian like everyone else who opposed his theory.
    Book Nine — 1812 (50% in)
  • Bagration was the best, Napoleon himself admitted that.
    Book Nine — 1812 (51% in)
  • It was said that the Emperor was leaving the army because it was in danger, it was said that Smolensk had surrendered, that Napoleon had an army of a million and only a miracle could save Russia.
    Book Nine — 1812 (72% in)
  • One of his brother Masons had revealed to Pierre the following prophecy concerning Napoleon, drawn from the Revelation of St. John.
    Book Nine — 1812 (79% in)
  • The French alphabet, written out with the same numerical values as the Hebrew, in which the first nine letters denote units and the others tens, will have the following significance: a b c d e f g h i k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l m n o p q r s 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 t u v w x y 100 110 120 130 140 150 z 160 Writing the words L'Empereur Napoleon in numbers, it appears that the sum of them is 666, and that Napoleon was therefore the beast foretold in the Apocalypse.
    Book Nine — 1812 (79% in)
  • The French alphabet, written out with the same numerical values as the Hebrew, in which the first nine letters denote units and the others tens, will have the following significance: a b c d e f g h i k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 l m n o p q r s 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 t u v w x y 100 110 120 130 140 150 z 160 Writing the words L'Empereur Napoleon in numbers, it appears that the sum of them is 666, and that Napoleon was therefore the beast foretold in the Apocalypse.
    Book Nine — 1812 (79% in)
  • Moreover, by applying the same system to the words quarante-deux, * which was the term allowed to the beast that "spoke great things and blasphemies," the same number 666 was obtained; from which it followed that the limit fixed for Napoleon's power had come in the year 1812 when the French emperor was forty-two.
    Book Nine — 1812 (79% in)
  • This prophecy pleased Pierre very much and he often asked himself what would put an end to the power of the beast, that is, of Napoleon, and tried by the same system of using letters as numbers and adding them up, to find an answer to the question that engrossed him.
    Book Nine — 1812 (79% in)
  • His love for Natasha, Antichrist, Napoleon, the invasion, the comet, 666, L'Empereur Napoleon, and L'russe Besuhof—all this had to mature and culminate, to lift him out of that spellbound, petty sphere of Moscow habits in which he felt himself held captive and lead him to a great achievement and great happiness.
    Book Nine — 1812 (80% in)
  • His love for Natasha, Antichrist, Napoleon, the invasion, the comet, 666, L'Empereur Napoleon, and L'russe Besuhof—all this had to mature and culminate, to lift him out of that spellbound, petty sphere of Moscow habits in which he felt himself held captive and lead him to a great achievement and great happiness.
    Book Nine — 1812 (80% in)
  • ...Count Rostopchin and the latter's tone of anxious hurry, the meeting with the courier who talked casually of how badly things were going in the army, the rumors of the discovery of spies in Moscow and of a leaflet in circulation stating that Napoleon promised to be in both the Russian capitals by the autumn, and the talk of the Emperor's being expected to arrive next day—all aroused with fresh force that feeling of agitation and expectation in Pierre which he had been conscious of ever...
    Book Nine — 1812 (81% in)
  • Napoleon began the war with Russia because he could not resist going to Dresden, could not help having his head turned by the homage he received, could not help donning a Polish uniform and yielding to the stimulating influence of a June morning, and could not refrain from bursts of anger in the presence of Kurakin and then of Balashev.
    Book Ten — 1812 (0% in)
  • Providence compelled all these men, striving to attain personal aims, to further the accomplishment of a stupendous result no one of them at all expected—neither Napoleon, nor Alexander, nor still less any of those who did the actual fighting.
    Book Ten — 1812 (0% in)
  • Not only did no one see this, but on the Russian side every effort was made to hinder the only thing that could save Russia, while on the French side, despite Napoleon's experience and so-called military genius, every effort was directed to pushing on to Moscow at the end of the summer, that is, to doing the very thing that was bound to lead to destruction.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • In historical works on the year 1812 French writers are very fond of saying that Napoleon felt the danger of extending his line, that he sought a battle and that his marshals advised him to stop at Smolensk, and of making similar statements to show that the danger of the campaign was even then understood.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • Russian authors are still fonder of telling us that from the commencement of the campaign a Scythian war plan was adopted to lure Napoleon into the depths of Russia, and this plan some of them attribute to Pfuel, others to a certain Frenchman, others to Toll, and others again to Alexander himself—pointing to notes, projects, and letters which contain hints of such a line of action.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • Conjectures as to Napoleon's awareness of the danger of extending his line, and (on the Russian side) as to luring the enemy into the depths of Russia, are evidently of that kind, and only by much straining can historians attribute such conceptions to Napoleon and his marshals, or such plans to the Russian commanders.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • Conjectures as to Napoleon's awareness of the danger of extending his line, and (on the Russian side) as to luring the enemy into the depths of Russia, are evidently of that kind, and only by much straining can historians attribute such conceptions to Napoleon and his marshals, or such plans to the Russian commanders.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • And not only was Napoleon not afraid to extend his line, but he welcomed every step forward as a triumph and did not seek battle as eagerly as in former campaigns, but very lazily.
    Book Ten — 1812 (1% in)
  • Napoleon having cut our armies apart advanced far into the country and missed several chances of forcing an engagement.
    Book Ten — 1812 (2% in)
  • The facts clearly show that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of the advance on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commanders then think of luring Napoleon on, but quite the contrary.
    Book Ten — 1812 (2% in)
  • The facts clearly show that Napoleon did not foresee the danger of the advance on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commanders then think of luring Napoleon on, but quite the contrary.
    Book Ten — 1812 (2% in)
  • The luring of Napoleon into the depths of the country was not the result of any plan, for no one believed it to be possible; it resulted from a most complex interplay of intrigues, aims, and wishes among those who took part in the war and had no perception whatever of the inevitable, or of the one way of saving Russia.
    Book Ten — 1812 (2% in)
  • Napoleon advanced farther and we retired, thus arriving at the very result which caused his destruction.
    Book Ten — 1812 (3% in)
  • The town was being bombarded by a hundred and thirty guns which Napoleon had ordered up after four o'clock.
    Book Ten — 1812 (11% in)
  • I swear to you on my honor that Napoleon was in such a fix as never before and might have lost half his army but could not have taken Smolensk.
    Book Ten — 1812 (17% in)
  • He is said to be more Napoleon's man than ours, and he is always advising the Minister.
    Book Ten — 1812 (18% in)
  • In the French circle of Helene and Rumyantsev the reports of the cruelty of the enemy and of the war were contradicted and all Napoleon's attempts at conciliation were discussed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (18% in)
  • Napoleon's historian Thiers, like other of his historians, trying to justify his hero says that he was drawn to the walls of Moscow against his will.
    Book Ten — 1812 (20% in)
  • He is as right as other historians who look for the explanation of historic events in the will of one man; he is as right as the Russian historians who maintain that Napoleon was drawn to Moscow by the skill of the Russian commanders.
    Book Ten — 1812 (20% in)
  • After Smolensk Napoleon sought a battle beyond Dorogobuzh at Vyazma, and then at Tsarevo-Zaymishche, but it happened that owing to a conjunction of innumerable circumstances the Russians could not give battle till they reached Borodino, seventy miles from Moscow.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • From Vyazma Napoleon ordered a direct advance on Moscow.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Moscou, la capitale asiatique de ce grand empire, la ville sacree des peuples d'Alexandre, Moscou avec ses innombrables eglises en forme de pagodes chinoises, * this Moscow gave Napoleon's imagination no rest.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Followed by Lelorgne d'Ideville, an interpreter, he overtook Napoleon at a gallop and reined in his horse with an amused expression.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • "Well?" asked Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Napoleon smiled and told them to give the Cossack a horse and bring the man to him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Several adjutants galloped off, and an hour later, Lavrushka, the serf Denisov had handed over to Rostov, rode up to Napoleon in an orderly's jacket and on a French cavalry saddle, with a merry, and tipsy face.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Napoleon told him to ride by his side and began questioning him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • "The Cossack, not knowing in what company he was, for Napoleon's plain appearance had nothing about it that would reveal to an Oriental mind the presence of a monarch, talked with extreme familiarity of the incidents of the war," says Thiers, narrating this episode.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Finding himself in the company of Napoleon, whose identity he had easily and surely recognized, Lavrushka was not in the least abashed but merely did his utmost to gain his new master's favor.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • He knew very well that this was Napoleon, but Napoleon's presence could no more intimidate him than Rostov's, or a sergeant major's with the rods, would have done, for he had nothing that either the sergeant major or Napoleon could deprive him of.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • He knew very well that this was Napoleon, but Napoleon's presence could no more intimidate him than Rostov's, or a sergeant major's with the rods, would have done, for he had nothing that either the sergeant major or Napoleon could deprive him of.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • He knew very well that this was Napoleon, but Napoleon's presence could no more intimidate him than Rostov's, or a sergeant major's with the rods, would have done, for he had nothing that either the sergeant major or Napoleon could deprive him of.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • But when Napoleon asked him whether the Russians thought they would beat Bonaparte or not, Lavrushka screwed up his eyes and considered.
    Book Ten — 1812 (21% in)
  • Lelorgne d'Ideville smilingly interpreted this speech to Napoleon thus: "If a battle takes place within the next three days the French will win, but if later, God knows what will happen."
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • Napoleon did not smile, though he was evidently in high good humor, and he ordered these words to be repeated.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • Lavrushka noticed this and to entertain him further, pretending not to know who Napoleon was, added: "We know that you have Bonaparte and that he has beaten everybody in the world, but we are a different matter....
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • After riding a few paces in silence, Napoleon turned to Berthier and said he wished to see how the news that he was talking to the Emperor himself, to that very Emperor who had written his immortally victorious name on the Pyramids, would affect this enfant du Don.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • Lavrushka, understanding that this was done to perplex him and that Napoleon expected him to be frightened, to gratify his new masters promptly pretended to be astonished and awe-struck, opened his eyes wide, and assumed the expression he usually put on when taken to be whipped.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • "As soon as Napoleon's interpreter had spoken," says Thiers, "the Cossack, seized by amazement, did not utter another word, but rode on, his eyes fixed on the conqueror whose fame had reached him across the steppes of the East.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • Napoleon, after making the Cossack a present, had him set free like a bird restored to its native fields.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • Napoleon rode on, dreaming of the Moscow that so appealed to his imagination, and "the bird restored to its native fields" galloped to our outposts, inventing on the way all that had not taken place but that he meant to relate to his comrades.
    Book Ten — 1812 (22% in)
  • On the way to Bogucharovo, a princely estate with a dwelling house and farm where they hoped to find many domestic serfs and pretty girls, they questioned Lavrushka about Napoleon and laughed at his stories, and raced one another to try Ilyin's horse.
    Book Ten — 1812 (36% in)
  • "The French," replied Ilyin jestingly, "and here is Napoleon himself"—and he pointed to Lavrushka.
    Book Ten — 1812 (37% in)
  • "I give my word of honor as a Wussian officer," said Denisov, "that I can bweak Napoleon's line of communication!"
    Book Ten — 1812 (44% in)
  • Rostopchin's broadsheets, headed by woodcuts of a drink shop, a potman, and a Moscow burgher called Karpushka Chigirin, "who—having been a militiaman and having had rather too much at the pub—heard that Napoleon wished to come to Moscow, grew angry, abused the French in very bad language, came out of the drink shop, and, under the sign of the eagle, began to address the assembled people," were read and discussed, together with the latest of Vasili Lvovich Pushkin's bouts rimes.
    Book Ten — 1812 (47% in)
  • It was said that Rostopchin had expelled all Frenchmen and even all foreigners from Moscow, and that there had been some spies and agents of Napoleon among them; but this was told chiefly to introduce Rostopchin's witty remark on that occasion.
    Book Ten — 1812 (47% in)
  • * There was talk of all the government offices having been already removed from Moscow, and to this Shinshin's witticism was added—that for that alone Moscow ought to be grateful to Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (48% in)
  • "I won't submit to your Napoleon!
    Book Ten — 1812 (50% in)
  • What the result must be was quite obvious, and yet Napoleon offered and Kutuzov accepted that battle.
    Book Ten — 1812 (52% in)
  • If the commanders had been guided by reason, it would seem that it must have been obvious to Napoleon that by advancing thirteen hundred miles and giving battle with a probability of losing a quarter of his army, he was advancing to certain destruction, and it must have been equally clear to Kutuzov that by accepting battle and risking the loss of a quarter of his army he would certainly lose Moscow.
    Book Ten — 1812 (52% in)
  • Yet the shrewd and experienced Kutuzov accepted the battle, while Napoleon, who was said to be a commander of genius, gave it, losing a quarter of his army and lengthening his lines of communication still more.
    Book Ten — 1812 (53% in)
  • Napoleon's historians themselves tell us that from Smolensk onwards he wished to stop, knew the danger of his extended position, and knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, for he had seen at Smolensk the state in which Russian towns were left to him, and had not received a single reply to his repeated announcements of his wish to negotiate.
    Book Ten — 1812 (53% in)
  • On the twenty-fourth, we are told, Napoleon attacked this advanced post and took it, and, on the twenty-sixth, attacked the whole Russian army, which was in position on the field of Borodino.
    Book Ten — 1812 (53% in)
  • Napoleon, riding to Valuevo on the twenty-fourth, did not see (as the history books say he did) the position of the Russians from Utitsa to Borodino (he could not have seen that position because it did not exist), nor did he see an advanced post of the Russian army, but while pursuing the Russian rearguard he came upon the left flank of the Russian position—at the Shevardino Redoubt—and unexpectedly for the Russians moved his army across the Kolocha.
    Book Ten — 1812 (54% in)
  • By crossing to the other side of the Kolocha to the left of the highroad, Napoleon shifted the whole forthcoming battle from right to left (looking from the Russian side) and transferred it to the plain between Utitsa, Semenovsk, and Borodino—a plain no more advantageous as a position than any other plain in Russia—and there the whole battle of the twenty-sixth of August took place.
    Book Ten — 1812 (54% in)
  • Had Napoleon not ridden out on the evening of the twenty-fourth to the Kolocha, and had he not then ordered an immediate attack on the redoubt but had begun the attack next morning, no one would have doubted that the Shevardino Redoubt was the left flank of our position, and the battle would have taken place where we expected it.
    Book Ten — 1812 (54% in)
  • We should have attacked Napoleon in the center or on the right, and the engagement would have taken place on the twenty-fifth, in the position we intended and had fortified.
    Book Ten — 1812 (55% in)
  • Below the village the road crossed the river by a bridge and, winding down and up, rose higher and higher to the village of Valuevo visible about four miles away, where Napoleon was then stationed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (58% in)
  • The officers said that either Napoleon or Murat was there, and they all gazed eagerly at this little group of horsemen.
    Book Ten — 1812 (63% in)
  • Pierre also looked at them, trying to guess which of the scarcely discernible figures was Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (63% in)
  • But Napoleon came and swept him aside, unconscious of his existence, as he might brush a chip from his path, and his Bald Hills and his whole life fell to pieces.
    Book Ten — 1812 (64% in)
  • Then all these Westphalians and Hessians whom Napoleon is leading would not follow him into Russia, and we should not go to fight in Austria and Prussia without knowing why.
    Book Ten — 1812 (68% in)
  • On August 25, the eve of the battle of Borodino, M. de Beausset, prefect of the French Emperor's palace, arrived at Napoleon's quarters at Valuevo with Colonel Fabvier, the former from Paris and the latter from Madrid.
    Book Ten — 1812 (69% in)
  • Donning his court uniform, M. de Beausset ordered a box he had brought for the Emperor to be carried before him and entered the first compartment of Napoleon's tent, where he began opening the box while conversing with Napoleon's aides-de-camp who surrounded him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Donning his court uniform, M. de Beausset ordered a box he had brought for the Emperor to be carried before him and entered the first compartment of Napoleon's tent, where he began opening the box while conversing with Napoleon's aides-de-camp who surrounded him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • The Emperor Napoleon had not yet left his bedroom and was finishing his toilet.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon's short hair was wet and matted on the forehead, but his face, though puffy and yellow, expressed physical satisfaction.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon, frowning, looked at him from under his brows.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • But Napoleon had dressed and come out with such unexpected rapidity that he had not time to finish arranging the surprise.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon noticed at once what they were about and guessed that they were not ready.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon made ironic remarks during Fabvier's account, as if he had not expected that matters could go otherwise in his absence.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • "I must make up for that in Moscow," said Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon turned to him gaily and pulled his ear.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • But though Napoleon knew that de Beausset had to say something of this kind, and though in his lucid moments he knew it was untrue, he was pleased to hear it from him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (70% in)
  • Napoleon smiled and, lifting his head absent-mindedly, glanced to the right.
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • "Ha, what's this?" asked Napoleon, noticing that all the courtiers were looking at something concealed under a cloth.
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • It was a portrait, painted in bright colors by Gerard, of the son borne to Napoleon by the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, the boy whom for some reason everyone called "The King of Rome."
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • Though it was not clear what the artist meant to express by depicting the so-called King of Rome spiking the earth with a stick, the allegory apparently seemed to Napoleon, as it had done to all who had seen it in Paris, quite clear and very pleasing.
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • And while he was doing M. de Beausset the honor of breakfasting with him, they heard, as Napoleon had anticipated, the rapturous cries of the officers and men of the Old Guard who had run up to see the portrait.
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • After breakfast Napoleon in de Beausset's presence dictated his order of the day to the army.
    Book Ten — 1812 (71% in)
  • "Before Moscow!" repeated Napoleon, and inviting M. de Beausset, who was so fond of travel, to accompany him on his ride, he went out of the tent to where the horses stood saddled.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • But Napoleon nodded to the traveler, and de Beausset had to mount.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • When Napoleon came out of the tent the shouting of the Guards before his son's portrait grew still louder.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • Napoleon frowned.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • On the twenty-fifth of August, so his historians tell us, Napoleon spent the whole day on horseback inspecting the locality, considering plans submitted to him by his marshals, and personally giving commands to his generals.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • It would seem that not much consideration was needed to reach this conclusion, nor any particular care or trouble on the part of the Emperor and his marshals, nor was there any need of that special and supreme quality called genius that people are so apt to ascribe to Napoleon; yet the historians who described the event later and the men who then surrounded Napoleon, and he himself, thought otherwise.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • It would seem that not much consideration was needed to reach this conclusion, nor any particular care or trouble on the part of the Emperor and his marshals, nor was there any need of that special and supreme quality called genius that people are so apt to ascribe to Napoleon; yet the historians who described the event later and the men who then surrounded Napoleon, and he himself, thought otherwise.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • Napoleon rode over the plain and surveyed the locality with a profound air and in silence, nodded with approval or shook his head dubiously, and without communicating to the generals around him the profound course of ideas which guided his decisions merely gave them his final conclusions in the form of commands.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • Having listened to a suggestion from Davout, who was now called Prince d'Eckmuhl, to turn the Russian left wing, Napoleon said it should not be done, without explaining why not.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • To a proposal made by General Campan (who was to attack the fleches) to lead his division through the woods, Napoleon agreed, though the so-called Duke of Elchingen (Ney) ventured to remark that a movement through the woods was dangerous and might disorder the division.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • Having inspected the country opposite the Shevardino Redoubt, Napoleon pondered a little in silence and then indicated the spots where two batteries should be set up by the morrow to act against the Russian entrenchments, and the places where, in line with them, the field artillery should be placed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (72% in)
  • These dispositions, which are very obscure and confused if one allows oneself to regard the arrangements without religious awe of his genius, related to Napoleon's orders to deal with four points—four different orders.
    Book Ten — 1812 (73% in)
  • In the disposition it is said first that the batteries placed on the spot chosen by Napoleon, with the guns of Pernetti and Fouche; which were to come in line with them, 102 guns in all, were to open fire and shower shells on the Russian fleches and redoubts.
    Book Ten — 1812 (73% in)
  • This could not be done, as from the spots selected by Napoleon the projectiles did not carry to the Russian works, and those 102 guns shot into the air until the nearest commander, contrary to Napoleon's instructions, moved them forward.
    Book Ten — 1812 (73% in)
  • This could not be done, as from the spots selected by Napoleon the projectiles did not carry to the Russian works, and those 102 guns shot into the air until the nearest commander, contrary to Napoleon's instructions, moved them forward.
    Book Ten — 1812 (73% in)
  • General Campan's division did not seize the first fortification but was driven back, for on emerging from the wood it had to reform under grapeshot, of which Napoleon was unaware.
    Book Ten — 1812 (73% in)
  • After passing through Borodino the vice-King was driven back to the Kolocha and could get no farther; while the divisions of Morand and Gerard did not take the redoubt but were driven back, and the redoubt was only taken at the end of the battle by the cavalry (a thing probably unforeseen and not heard of by Napoleon).
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • But in the disposition it is said that, after the fight has commenced in this manner, orders will be given in accordance with the enemy's movements, and so it might be supposed that all necessary arrangements would be made by Napoleon during the battle.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • But this was not and could not be done, for during the whole battle Napoleon was so far away that, as appeared later, he could not know the course of the battle and not one of his orders during the fight could be executed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • Many historians say that the French did not win the battle of Borodino because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had not had a cold the orders he gave before and during the battle would have been still more full of genius and Russia would have been lost and the face of the world have been changed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • To historians who believe that Russia was shaped by the will of one man—Peter the Great—and that France from a republic became an empire and French armies went to Russia at the will of one man—Napoleon—to say that Russia remained a power because Napoleon had a bad cold on the twenty-fourth of August may seem logical and convincing.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • To historians who believe that Russia was shaped by the will of one man—Peter the Great—and that France from a republic became an empire and French armies went to Russia at the will of one man—Napoleon—to say that Russia remained a power because Napoleon had a bad cold on the twenty-fourth of August may seem logical and convincing.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight the battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement depended on his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation of his will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet who omitted to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the twenty-fourth would have been the savior of Russia.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight the battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement depended on his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation of his will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet who omitted to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the twenty-fourth would have been the savior of Russia.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • But to men who do not admit that Russia was formed by the will of one man, Peter I, or that the French Empire was formed and the war with Russia begun by the will of one man, Napoleon, that argument seems not merely untrue and irrational, but contrary to all human reality.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • To the question of what causes historic events another answer presents itself, namely, that the course of human events is predetermined from on high—depends on the coincidence of the wills of all who take part in the events, and that a Napoleon's influence on the course of these events is purely external and fictitious.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • ...of St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will, though he gave the order for it and thought it was done as a result of that order; and strange as it may seem to suppose that the slaughter of eighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to Napoleon's will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct of the battle and thought it was done because he ordered it; strange as these suppositions appear, yet human dignity—which tells me that each of us is, if not more at least not less a...
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • ...and strange as it may seem to suppose that the slaughter of eighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to Napoleon's will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct of the battle and thought it was done because he ordered it; strange as these suppositions appear, yet human dignity—which tells me that each of us is, if not more at least not less a man than the great Napoleon—demands the acceptance of that solution of the question, and historic investigation abundantly confirms it.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • At the battle of Borodino Napoleon shot at no one and killed no one.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle of Borodino not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own volition.
    Book Ten — 1812 (74% in)
  • Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight the Russians, they would have killed him and have proceeded to fight the Russians because it was inevitable.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, as compensation for mutilation and death, the words of posterity about their having been in the battle before Moscow, they cried "Vive l'Empereur!" just as they had cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at the sight of the portrait of the boy piercing the terrestrial globe with a toy stick, and just as they would have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at any nonsense that might be told them.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • So it was not because of Napoleon's commands that they killed their fellow men.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for none of his orders were executed and during the battle he did not know what was going on before him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • So the way in which these people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon's will but occurred independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds of thousands of people who took part in the common action.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold was the cause of his dispositions not being as well planned as on former occasions, and of his orders during the battle not being as good as previously, is quite baseless, which again shows that Napoleon's cold on the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • These dispositions and orders only seem worse than previous ones because the battle of Borodino was the first Napoleon did not win.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office as representative of authority as well as, and even better than, at other battles.
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • On returning from a second inspection of the lines, Napoleon remarked: "The chessmen are set up, the game will begin tomorrow!"
    Book Ten — 1812 (75% in)
  • Having finished his second glass of punch, Napoleon went to rest before the serious business which, he considered, awaited him next day.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon asked him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon looked at him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon frowned and sat silent for a long time leaning his head on his hand.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon took a lozenge, put it in his mouth, and glanced at his watch.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • "Have the biscuits and rice been served out to the regiments of the Guards?" asked Napoleon sternly.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Rapp replied that he had given the Emperor's order about the rice, but Napoleon shook his head in dissatisfaction as if not believing that his order had been executed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon ordered another glass to be brought for Rapp, and silently sipped his own.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • And having entered on the path of definition, of which he was fond, Napoleon suddenly and unexpectedly gave a new one.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • "Tomorrow we shall have to deal with Kutuzov!" said Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (76% in)
  • Napoleon walked about in front of his tent, looked at the fires and listened to these sounds, and as he was passing a tall guardsman in a shaggy cap, who was standing sentinel before his tent and had drawn himself up like a black pillar at sight of the Emperor, Napoleon stopped in front of him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (77% in)
  • Napoleon walked about in front of his tent, looked at the fires and listened to these sounds, and as he was passing a tall guardsman in a shaggy cap, who was standing sentinel before his tent and had drawn himself up like a black pillar at sight of the Emperor, Napoleon stopped in front of him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (77% in)
  • Napoleon nodded and walked away.
    Book Ten — 1812 (77% in)
  • At half-past five Napoleon rode to the village of Shevardino.
    Book Ten — 1812 (77% in)
  • Napoleon with his suite rode up to the Shevardino Redoubt where he dismounted.
    Book Ten — 1812 (77% in)
  • From the Shevardino Redoubt where Napoleon was standing the fleches were two thirds of a mile away, and it was more than a mile as the crow flies to Borodino, so that Napoleon could not see what was happening there, especially as the smoke mingling with the mist hid the whole locality.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • From the Shevardino Redoubt where Napoleon was standing the fleches were two thirds of a mile away, and it was more than a mile as the crow flies to Borodino, so that Napoleon could not see what was happening there, especially as the smoke mingling with the mist hid the whole locality.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • The sun had risen brightly and its slanting rays struck straight into Napoleon's face as, shading his eyes with his hand, he looked at the fleches.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • Napoleon, standing on the knoll, looked through a field glass, and in its small circlet saw smoke and men, sometimes his own and sometimes Russians, but when he looked again with the naked eye, he could not tell where what he had seen was.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • From the battlefield adjutants he had sent out, and orderlies from his marshals, kept galloping up to Napoleon with reports of the progress of the action, but all these reports were false, both because it was impossible in the heat of battle to say what was happening at any given moment and because many of the adjutants did not go to the actual place of conflict but reported what they had heard from others; and also because while an adjutant was riding more than a mile to Napoleon...
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • ...marshals, kept galloping up to Napoleon with reports of the progress of the action, but all these reports were false, both because it was impossible in the heat of battle to say what was happening at any given moment and because many of the adjutants did not go to the actual place of conflict but reported what they had heard from others; and also because while an adjutant was riding more than a mile to Napoleon circumstances changed and the news he brought was already becoming false.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • The adjutant asked whether Napoleon wished the troops to cross it?
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • Napoleon gave orders that the troops should form up on the farther side and wait.
    Book Ten — 1812 (85% in)
  • An adjutant galloped up from the fleches with a pale and frightened face and reported to Napoleon that their attack had been repulsed, Campan wounded, and Davout killed; yet at the very time the adjutant had been told that the French had been repulsed, the fleches had in fact been recaptured by other French troops, and Davout was alive and only slightly bruised.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • On the basis of these necessarily untrustworthy reports Napoleon gave his orders, which had either been executed before he gave them or could not be and were not executed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • The marshals and generals, who were nearer to the field of battle but, like Napoleon, did not take part in the actual fighting and only occasionally went within musket range, made their own arrangements without asking Napoleon and issued orders where and in what direction to fire and where cavalry should gallop and infantry should run.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • The marshals and generals, who were nearer to the field of battle but, like Napoleon, did not take part in the actual fighting and only occasionally went within musket range, made their own arrangements without asking Napoleon and issued orders where and in what direction to fire and where cavalry should gallop and infantry should run.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • But even their orders, like Napoleon's, were seldom carried out, and then but partially.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • All orders as to where and when to move the guns, when to send infantry to shoot or horsemen to ride down the Russian infantry—all such orders were given by the officers on the spot nearest to the units concerned, without asking either Ney, Davout, or Murat, much less Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • Napoleon's generals—Davout, Ney, and Murat, who were near that region of fire and sometimes even entered it—repeatedly led into it huge masses of well-ordered troops.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • In the middle of the day Murat sent his adjutant to Napoleon to demand reinforcements.
    Book Ten — 1812 (86% in)
  • Napoleon sat at the foot of the knoll, drinking punch, when Murat's adjutant galloped up with an assurance that the Russians would be routed if His Majesty would let him have another division.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • "Reinforcements?" said Napoleon in a tone of stern surprise, looking at the adjutant—a handsome lad with long black curls arranged like Murat's own—as though he did not understand his words.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • "Reinforcements!" thought Napoleon to himself.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon rose and having summoned Caulaincourt and Berthier began talking to them about matters unconnected with the battle.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • In the midst of this conversation, which was beginning to interest Napoleon, Berthier's eyes turned to look at a general with a suite, who was galloping toward the knoll on a lathering horse.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon shrugged his shoulders and continued to pace up and down without replying.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • "You are very fiery, Belliard," said Napoleon, when he again came up to the general.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • "Now then, what do you want?" asked Napoleon in the tone of a man irritated at being continually disturbed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • "Asks for reinforcements?" said Napoleon with an angry gesture.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon nodded assent.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon gazed silently in that direction.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon did not notice that in regard to his army he was playing the part of a doctor who hinders by his medicines—a role he so justly understood and condemned.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon sat on a campstool, wrapped in thought.
    Book Ten — 1812 (87% in)
  • Napoleon silently shook his head in negation.
    Book Ten — 1812 (88% in)
  • "Go away...." exclaimed Napoleon suddenly and morosely, and turned aside.
    Book Ten — 1812 (88% in)
  • Napoleon was experiencing a feeling of depression like that of an ever-lucky gambler who, after recklessly flinging money about and always winning, suddenly just when he has calculated all the chances of the game, finds that the more he considers his play the more surely he loses.
    Book Ten — 1812 (88% in)
  • Despite news of the capture of the fleches, Napoleon saw that this was not the same, not at all the same, as what had happened in his former battles.
    Book Ten — 1812 (88% in)
  • But Napoleon with his long experience of war well knew the meaning of a battle not gained by the attacking side in eight hours, after all efforts had been expended.
    Book Ten — 1812 (88% in)
  • The news that the Russians were attacking the left flank of the French army aroused that horror in Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • What do you say?" asked Napoleon.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Amid the powder smoke, slowly dispersing over the whole space through which Napoleon rode, horses and men were lying in pools of blood, singly or in heaps.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Neither Napoleon nor any of his generals had ever before seen such horrors or so many slain in such a small area.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Napoleon rode up the high ground at Semenovsk, and through the smoke saw ranks of men in uniforms of a color unfamiliar to him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Napoleon stopped his horse and again fell into the reverie from which Berthier had aroused him.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • One of the generals rode up to Napoleon and ventured to offer to lead the Old Guard into action.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Ney and Berthier, standing near Napoleon, exchanged looks and smiled contemptuously at this general's senseless offer.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • Napoleon bowed his head and remained silent a long time.
    Book Ten — 1812 (89% in)
  • The attack directed by Napoleon against our left flank had been several times repulsed.
    Book Ten — 1812 (90% in)
  • The terrible spectacle of the battlefield covered with dead and wounded, together with the heaviness of his head and the news that some twenty generals he knew personally had been killed or wounded, and the consciousness of the impotence of his once mighty arm, produced an unexpected impression on Napoleon who usually liked to look at the killed and wounded, thereby, he considered, testing his strength of mind.
    Book Ten — 1812 (96% in)
  • Napoleon had assented and had given orders that news should be brought to him of the effect those batteries produced.
    Book Ten — 1812 (97% in)
  • ..." said Napoleon in a hoarse voice.
    Book Ten — 1812 (97% in)
  • "They want more!" croaked Napoleon frowning.
    Book Ten — 1812 (97% in)
  • Napoleon, predestined by Providence for the gloomy role of executioner of the peoples, assured himself that the aim of his actions had been the peoples' welfare and that he could control the fate of millions and by the employment of power confer benefactions.
    Book Ten — 1812 (98% in)
  • The French, with the memory of all their former victories during fifteen years, with the assurance of Napoleon's invincibility, with the consciousness that they had captured part of the battlefield and had lost only a quarter of their men and still had their Guards intact, twenty thousand strong, might easily have made that effort.
    Book Ten — 1812 (99% in)
  • Some historians say that Napoleon need only have used his Old Guards, who were intact, and the battle would have been won.
    Book Ten — 1812 (99% in)
  • To speak of what would have happened had Napoleon sent his Guards is like talking of what would happen if autumn became spring.
    Book Ten — 1812 (99% in)
  • Napoleon did not give his Guards, not because he did not want to, but because it could not be done.
    Book Ten — 1812 (99% in)
  • It was not Napoleon alone who had experienced that nightmare feeling of the mighty arm being stricken powerless, but all the generals and soldiers of his army whether they had taken part in the battle or not, after all their experience of previous battles—when after one tenth of such efforts the enemy had fled—experienced a similar feeling of terror before an enemy who, after losing HALF his men, stood as threateningly at the end as at the beginning of the battle.
    Book Ten — 1812 (**% in)
  • The direct consequence of the battle of Borodino was Napoleon's senseless flight from Moscow, his retreat along the old Smolensk road, the destruction of the invading army of five hundred thousand men, and the downfall of Napoleonic France, on which at Borodino for the first time the hand of an opponent of stronger spirit had been laid.
    Book Ten — 1812 (**% in)
  • The historians, replying to this question, lay before us the sayings and doings of a few dozen men in a building in the city of Paris, calling these sayings and doings "the Revolution"; then they give a detailed biography of Napoleon and of certain people favorable or hostile to him; tell of the influence some of these people had on others, and say: that is why this movement took place and those are its laws.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (2% in)
  • The sum of human wills produced the Revolution and Napoleon, and only the sum of those wills first tolerated and then destroyed them.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (2% in)
  • Every soldier in Napoleon's army felt this and the invasion moved on by its own momentum.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (3% in)
  • The question for him now was: "Have I really allowed Napoleon to reach Moscow, and when did I do so?
    Book Eleven — 1812 (7% in)
  • He was convinced that he alone could maintain command of the army in these difficult circumstances, and that in all the world he alone could encounter the invincible Napoleon without fear, and he was horrified at the thought of the order he had to issue.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (7% in)
  • It is impossible to suppose that Rostopchin had scared them by his accounts of horrors Napoleon had committed in conquered countries.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (11% in)
  • The first people to go away were the rich educated people who knew quite well that Vienna and Berlin had remained intact and that during Napoleon's occupation the inhabitants had spent their time pleasantly in the company of the charming Frenchmen whom the Russians, and especially the Russian ladies, then liked so much.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (11% in)
  • They knew that it was for the army to fight, and that if it could not succeed it would not do to take young ladies and house serfs to the Three Hills quarter of Moscow to fight Napoleon, and that they must go away, sorry as they were to abandon their property to destruction.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (11% in)
  • The prince tried to comfort her, but Helene, as if quite distraught, said through her tears that there was nothing to prevent her marrying, that there were precedents (there were up to that time very few, but she mentioned Napoleon and some other exalted personages), that she had never been her husband's wife, and that she had been sacrificed.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (13% in)
  • "If he is accused of circulating Napoleon's proclamation it is not proved that he did so," said Pierre without looking at Rostopchin, "and Vereshchagin...."
    Book Eleven — 1812 (24% in)
  • At that very time, at ten in the morning of the second of September, Napoleon was standing among his troops on the Poklonny Hill looking at the panorama spread out before him.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (45% in)
  • The view of the strange city with its peculiar architecture, such as he had never seen before, filled Napoleon with the rather envious and uneasy curiosity men feel when they see an alien form of life that has no knowledge of them.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (46% in)
  • By the indefinite signs which, even at a distance, distinguish a living body from a dead one, Napoleon from the Poklonny Hill perceived the throb of life in the town and felt, as it were, the breathing of that great and beautiful body.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (46% in)
  • Every Russian looking at Moscow feels her to be a mother; every foreigner who sees her, even if ignorant of her significance as the mother city, must feel her feminine character, and Napoleon felt it.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (46% in)
  • It seemed to Napoleon that the chief import of what was taking place lay in the personal struggle between himself and Alexander.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (46% in)
  • Napoleon had lunched and was again standing in the same place on the Poklonny Hill awaiting the deputation.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (47% in)
  • That speech was full of dignity and greatness as Napoleon understood it.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (47% in)
  • Drawn on by the movement of his troops Napoleon rode with them as far as the Dorogomilov gate, but there again stopped and, dismounting from his horse, paced for a long time by the Kammer-Kollezski rampart, awaiting the deputation.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (48% in)
  • So in the same way Moscow was empty when Napoleon, weary, uneasy, and morose, paced up and down in front of the Kammer-Kollezski rampart, awaiting what to his mind was a necessary, if but formal, observance of the proprieties—a deputation.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (50% in)
  • When with due circumspection Napoleon was informed that Moscow was empty, he looked angrily at his informant, turned away, and silently continued to walk to and fro.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (50% in)
  • He must remain in Moscow, concealing his name, and must meet Napoleon and kill him, and either perish or put an end to the misery of all Europe—which it seemed to him was solely due to Napoleon.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (72% in)
  • He must remain in Moscow, concealing his name, and must meet Napoleon and kill him, and either perish or put an end to the misery of all Europe—which it seemed to him was solely due to Napoleon.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (72% in)
  • In his fancy he did not clearly picture to himself either the striking of the blow or the death of Napoleon, but with extraordinary vividness and melancholy enjoyment imagined his own destruction and heroic endurance.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (73% in)
  • 'It is not I but the hand of Providence that punishes thee,' I shall say," thought he, imagining what he would say when killing Napoleon.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (73% in)
  • Napoleon was to enter the town next day.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (79% in)
  • "No matter, dagger will do," he said to himself, though when planning his design he had more than once come to the conclusion that the chief mistake made by the student in 1809 had been to try to kill Napoleon with a dagger.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (92% in)
  • And even had he not been hindered by anything on the way, his intention could not now have been carried out, for Napoleon had passed the Arbat more than four hours previously on his way from the Dorogomilov suburb to the Kremlin, and was now sitting in a very gloomy frame of mind in a royal study in the Kremlin, giving detailed and exact orders as to measures to be taken immediately to extinguish the fire, to prevent looting, and to reassure the inhabitants.
    Book Eleven — 1812 (93% in)
  • Everyone believed the victory to have been complete, and some even spoke of Napoleon's having been captured, of his deposition, and of the choice of a new ruler for France.
    Book Twelve — 1812 (7% in)
  • I always said he was the only man capable of defeating Napoleon.
    Book Twelve — 1812 (8% in)
  • Napoleon or I," said the Emperor, touching his breast.
    Book Twelve — 1812 (14% in)
  • Provincial life in 1812 went on very much as usual, but with this difference, that it was livelier in the towns in consequence of the arrival of many wealthy families from Moscow, and as in everything that went on in Russia at that time a special recklessness was noticeable, an "in for a penny, in for a pound—who cares?" spirit, and the inevitable small talk, instead of turning on the weather and mutual acquaintances, now turned on Moscow, the army, and Napoleon.
    Book Twelve — 1812 (20% in)
  • The crowd consisted of a few Russians and many of Napoleon's soldiers who were not on duty—Germans, Italians, and Frenchmen, in a variety of uniforms.
    Book Twelve — 1812 (57% in)
  • It may seem to be a matter of indifference whether we understand the meaning of historical events this way or that; yet there is the same difference between a man who says that the people of the West moved on the East because Napoleon wished it and a man who says that this happened because it had to happen, as there is between those who declared that the earth was stationary and that the planets moved round it and those who admitted that they did not know what upheld the earth, but...
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (1% in)
  • But it is hard to understand why military writers, and following them others, consider this flank march to be the profound conception of some one man who saved Russia and destroyed Napoleon.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (2% in)
  • If Napoleon had not remained inactive?
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (3% in)
  • What would have happened if on approaching Tarutino, Napoleon had attacked the Russians with but a tenth of the energy he had shown when he attacked them at Smolensk?
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (4% in)
  • Napoleon, with his usual assurance that whatever entered his head was right, wrote to Kutuzov the first words that occurred to him, though they were meaningless.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (8% in)
  • Napoleon himself was in Moscow as late as the twenty-fifth.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (13% in)
  • In view of all this information, when the enemy has scattered his forces in large detachments, and with Napoleon and his Guards in Moscow, is it possible that the enemy's forces confronting you are so considerable as not to allow of your taking the offensive?
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (13% in)
  • With a minimum of effort and insignificant losses, despite the greatest confusion, the most important results of the whole campaign were attained: the transition from retreat to advance, an exposure of the weakness of the French, and the administration of that shock which Napoleon's army had only awaited to begin its flight.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (32% in)
  • Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa; there can be no doubt about the victory for the battlefield remains in the hands of the French.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (33% in)
  • Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions, and incalculable wealth, is in Napoleon's hands.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (33% in)
  • Napoleon's position is most brilliant.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (33% in)
  • Yet Napoleon, that greatest of all geniuses, who the historians declare had control of the army, took none of these steps.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (34% in)
  • Of all that Napoleon might have done: wintering in Moscow, advancing on Petersburg or on Nizhni-Novgorod, or retiring by a more northerly or more southerly route (say by the road Kutuzov afterwards took), nothing more stupid or disastrous can be imagined than what he actually did.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (34% in)
  • Had Napoleon's aim been to destroy his army, the most skillful strategist could hardly have devised any series of actions that would so completely have accomplished that purpose, independently of anything the Russian army might do.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (34% in)
  • Napoleon, the man of genius, did this!
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (35% in)
  • The historians quite falsely represent Napoleon's faculties as having weakened in Moscow, and do so only because the results did not justify his actions.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (35% in)
  • With regard to military matters, Napoleon immediately on his entry into Moscow gave General Sabastiani strict orders to observe the movements of the Russian army, sent army corps out along the different roads, and charged Murat to find Kutuzov.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (36% in)
  • With regard to diplomatic questions, Napoleon summoned Captain Yakovlev, who had been robbed and was in rags and did not know how to get out of Moscow, minutely explained to him his whole policy and his magnanimity, and having written a letter to the Emperor Alexander in which he considered it his duty to inform his Friend and Brother that Rostopchin had managed affairs badly in Moscow, he dispatched Yakovlev to Petersburg.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (37% in)
  • With regard to supplies for the army, Napoleon decreed that all the troops in turn should enter Moscow a la maraude * to obtain provisions for themselves, so that the army might have its future provided for.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (39% in)
  • With regard to religion, Napoleon ordered the priests to be brought back and services to be again performed in the churches.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (40% in)
  • In regard to philanthropy, the greatest virtue of crowned heads, Napoleon also did all in his power.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (42% in)
  • But as food was too precious to be given to foreigners, who were for the most part enemies, Napoleon preferred to supply them with money with which to purchase food from outside, and had paper rubles distributed to them.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (43% in)
  • The fortifying of the Kremlin, for which la Mosquee (as Napoleon termed the church of Basil the Beatified) was to have been razed to the ground, proved quite useless.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (44% in)
  • The mining of the Kremlin only helped toward fulfilling Napoleon's wish that it should be blown up when he left Moscow—as a child wants the floor on which he has hurt himself to be beaten.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (44% in)
  • The pursuit of the Russian army, about which Napoleon was so concerned, produced an unheard-of result.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (44% in)
  • With reference to diplomacy, all Napoleon's arguments as to his magnanimity and justice, both to Tutolmin and to Yakovlev (whose chief concern was to obtain a greatcoat and a conveyance), proved useless; Alexander did not receive these envoys and did not reply to their embassage.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (44% in)
  • With regard to religion, as to which in Egypt matters had so easily been settled by Napoleon's visit to a mosque, no results were achieved.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (45% in)
  • Two or three priests who were found in Moscow did try to carry out Napoleon's wish, but one of them was slapped in the face by a French soldier while conducting service, and a French official reported of another that: "The priest whom I found and invited to say Mass cleaned and locked up the church.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (45% in)
  • Not only was the paper money valueless which Napoleon so graciously distributed to the unfortunate, but even silver lost its value in relation to gold.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (46% in)
  • But the most amazing example of the ineffectiveness of the orders given by the authorities at that time was Napoleon's attempt to stop the looting and re-establish discipline.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (46% in)
  • The news of that battle of Tarutino, unexpectedly received by Napoleon at a review, evoked in him a desire to punish the Russians (Thiers says), and he issued the order for departure which the whole army was demanding.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (48% in)
  • Napoleon, too, carried away his own personal tresor, but on seeing the baggage trains that impeded the army, he was (Thiers says) horror-struck.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (48% in)
  • To study the skillful tactics and aims of Napoleon and his army from the time it entered Moscow till it was destroyed is like studying the dying leaps and shudders of a mortally wounded animal.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (49% in)
  • Napoleon, under pressure from his whole army, did the same thing.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (49% in)
  • During the whole of that period Napoleon, who seems to us to have been the leader of all these movements—as the figurehead of a ship may seem to a savage to guide the vessel—acted like a child who, holding a couple of strings inside a carriage, thinks he is driving it.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (49% in)
  • It did not now occur to him to think of Russia, or the war, or politics, or Napoleon.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (59% in)
  • His intention of killing Napoleon and his calculations of the cabalistic number of the beast of the Apocalypse now seemed to him meaningless and even ridiculous.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (59% in)
  • Why, that must be Napoleon's own.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (71% in)
  • In the early days of October another envoy came to Kutuzov with a letter from Napoleon proposing peace and falsely dated from Moscow, though Napoleon was already not far from Kutuzov on the old Kaluga road.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (78% in)
  • In the early days of October another envoy came to Kutuzov with a letter from Napoleon proposing peace and falsely dated from Moscow, though Napoleon was already not far from Kutuzov on the old Kaluga road.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (78% in)
  • Ill with fever he went to Smolensk with twenty thousand men to defend the town against Napoleon's whole army.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (79% in)
  • The prisoner said that the troops that had entered Forminsk that day were the vanguard of the whole army, that Napoleon was there and the whole army had left Moscow four days previously.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (81% in)
  • Napoleon is at Forminsk," said Bolkhovitinov, unable to see in the dark who was speaking but guessing by the voice that it was not Konovnitsyn.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (83% in)
  • He thought too of the possibility (which he feared most of all) that Napoleon might fight him with his own weapon and remain in Moscow awaiting him.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (90% in)
  • Kutuzov even imagined that Napoleon's army might turn back through Medyn and Yukhnov, but the one thing he could not foresee was what happened—the insane, convulsive stampede of Napoleon's army during its first eleven days after leaving Moscow: a stampede which made possible what Kutuzov had not yet even dared to think of—the complete extermination of the French.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (90% in)
  • Kutuzov even imagined that Napoleon's army might turn back through Medyn and Yukhnov, but the one thing he could not foresee was what happened—the insane, convulsive stampede of Napoleon's army during its first eleven days after leaving Moscow: a stampede which made possible what Kutuzov had not yet even dared to think of—the complete extermination of the French.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (90% in)
  • Dorokhov's report about Broussier's division, the guerrillas' reports of distress in Napoleon's army, rumors of preparations for leaving Moscow, all confirmed the supposition that the French army was beaten and preparing for flight.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (90% in)
  • That Napoleon has left Moscow?
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (92% in)
  • Napoleon's historians describe to us his skilled maneuvers at Tarutino and Malo-Yaroslavets, and make conjectures as to what would have happened had Napoleon been in time to penetrate into the rich southern provinces.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (93% in)
  • Napoleon's historians describe to us his skilled maneuvers at Tarutino and Malo-Yaroslavets, and make conjectures as to what would have happened had Napoleon been in time to penetrate into the rich southern provinces.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (93% in)
  • The members of what had once been an army—Napoleon himself and all his soldiers fled—without knowing whither, each concerned only to make his escape as quickly as possible from this position, of the hopelessness of which they were all more or less vaguely conscious.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (94% in)
  • So it came about that at the council at Malo-Yaroslavets, when the generals pretending to confer together expressed various opinions, all mouths were closed by the opinion uttered by the simple-minded soldier Mouton who, speaking last, said what they all felt: that the one thing needful was to get away as quickly as possible; and no one, not even Napoleon, could say anything against that truth which they all recognized.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (95% in)
  • The day after the council at Malo-Yaroslavets Napoleon rode out early in the morning amid the lines of his army with his suite of marshals and an escort, on the pretext of inspecting the army and the scene of the previous and of the impending battle.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (95% in)
  • If the Cossacks did not capture Napoleon then, what saved him was the very thing that was destroying the French army, the booty on which the Cossacks fell.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (95% in)
  • Disregarding Napoleon they rushed after the plunder and Napoleon managed to escape.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (95% in)
  • Disregarding Napoleon they rushed after the plunder and Napoleon managed to escape.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (95% in)
  • Napoleon with his forty-year-old stomach understood that hint, not feeling his former agility and boldness, and under the influence of the fright the Cossacks had given him he at once agreed with Mouton and issued orders—as the historians tell us—to retreat by the Smolensk road.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • That Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army retreated, does not prove that Napoleon caused it to retreat, but that the forces which influenced the whole army and directed it along the Mozhaysk (that is, the Smolensk) road acted simultaneously on him also.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • That Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army retreated, does not prove that Napoleon caused it to retreat, but that the forces which influenced the whole army and directed it along the Mozhaysk (that is, the Smolensk) road acted simultaneously on him also.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • It was not that they knew that much food and fresh troops awaited them in Smolensk, nor that they were told so (on the contrary their superior officers, and Napoleon himself, knew that provisions were scarce there), but because this alone could give them strength to move on and endure their present privations.
    Book Thirteen — 1812 (97% in)
  • All Napoleon's wars serve to confirm this rule.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (1% in)
  • To strain the facts to fit the rules of history: to say that the field of battle at Borodino remained in the hands of the Russians, or that after Moscow there were other battles that destroyed Napoleon's army, is impossible.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (2% in)
  • Napoleon felt this, and from the time he took up the correct fencing attitude in Moscow and instead of his opponent's rapier saw a cudgel raised above his head, he did not cease to complain to Kutuzov and to the Emperor Alexander that the war was being carried on contrary to all the rules—as if there were any rules for killing people.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (5% in)
  • Still less did that genius, Napoleon, know it, for no one issued any orders to him.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (84% in)
  • At first while they were still moving along the Kaluga road, Napoleon's armies made their presence known, but later when they reached the Smolensk road they ran holding the clapper of their bell tight—and often thinking they were escaping ran right into the Russians.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (85% in)
  • The Russian army, expecting Napoleon to take the road to the right beyond the Dnieper—which was the only reasonable thing for him to do—themselves turned to the right and came out onto the highroad at Krasnoe.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (87% in)
  • Ney, who had had a corps of ten thousand men, reached Napoleon at Orsha with only one thousand men left, having abandoned all the rest and all his cannon, and having crossed the Dnieper at night by stealth at a wooded spot.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (88% in)
  • Mountains of books have been written by the historians about this campaign, and everywhere are described Napoleon's arrangements, the maneuvers, and his profound plans which guided the army, as well as the military genius shown by his marshals.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (89% in)
  • And Napoleon, escaping home in a warm fur coat and leaving to perish those who were not merely his comrades but were (in his opinion) men he had brought there, feels que c'est grand, *(2) and his soul is tranquil.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (91% in)
  • Napoleon le Grand!
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (91% in)
  • If the aim of the Russians consisted in cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his marshals—and that aim was not merely frustrated but all attempts to attain it were most shamefully baffled—then this last period of the campaign is quite rightly considered by the French to be a series of victories, and quite wrongly considered victorious by Russian historians.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (93% in)
  • The Russian military historians in so far as they submit to claims of logic must admit that conclusion, and in spite of their lyrical rhapsodies about valor, devotion, and so forth, must reluctantly admit that the French retreat from Moscow was a series of victories for Napoleon and defeats for Kutuzov.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (94% in)
  • The source of this contradiction lies in the fact that the historians studying the events from the letters of the sovereigns and the generals, from memoirs, reports, projects, and so forth, have attributed to this last period of the war of 1812 an aim that never existed, namely that of cutting off and capturing Napoleon with his marshals and his army.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (94% in)
  • It would have been senseless, first because Napoleon's disorganized army was flying from Russia with all possible speed, that is to say, was doing just what every Russian desired.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (94% in)
  • All the profound plans about cutting off and capturing Napoleon and his army were like the plan of a market gardener who, when driving out of his garden a cow that had trampled down the beds he had planted, should run to the gate and hit the cow on the head.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • But besides the fact that cutting off Napoleon with his army would have been senseless, it was impossible.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • Secondly it was impossible, because to paralyze the momentum with which Napoleon's army was retiring, incomparably greater forces than the Russians possessed would have been required.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (96% in)
  • The aim of cutting off Napoleon and his army never existed except in the imaginations of a dozen people.
    Book Fourteen — 1812 (99% in)
  • The chief cause of the wastage of Napoleon's army was the rapidity of its movement, and a convincing proof of this is the corresponding decrease of the Russian army.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (6% in)
  • So it was at Krasnoe, where they expected to find one of the three French columns and stumbled instead on Napoleon himself with sixteen thousand men.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (6% in)
  • At Krasnoe they took twenty-six thousand prisoners, several hundred cannon, and a stick called a "marshal's staff," and disputed as to who had distinguished himself and were pleased with their achievement—though they much regretted not having taken Napoleon, or at least a marshal or a hero of some sort, and reproached one another and especially Kutuzov for having failed to do so.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • They blamed Kutuzov and said that from the very beginning of the campaign he had prevented their vanquishing Napoleon, that he thought of nothing but satisfying his passions and would not advance from the Linen Factories because he was comfortable there, that at Krasnoe he checked the advance because on learning that Napoleon was there he had quite lost his head, and that it was probable that he had an understanding with Napoleon and had been bribed by him, and so on, and so on.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • They blamed Kutuzov and said that from the very beginning of the campaign he had prevented their vanquishing Napoleon, that he thought of nothing but satisfying his passions and would not advance from the Linen Factories because he was comfortable there, that at Krasnoe he checked the advance because on learning that Napoleon was there he had quite lost his head, and that it was probable that he had an understanding with Napoleon and had been bribed by him, and so on, and so on.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • They blamed Kutuzov and said that from the very beginning of the campaign he had prevented their vanquishing Napoleon, that he thought of nothing but satisfying his passions and would not advance from the Linen Factories because he was comfortable there, that at Krasnoe he checked the advance because on learning that Napoleon was there he had quite lost his head, and that it was probable that he had an understanding with Napoleon and had been bribed by him, and so on, and so on.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • Not only did his contemporaries, carried away by their passions, talk in this way, but posterity and history have acclaimed Napoleon as grand, while Kutuzov is described by foreigners as a crafty, dissolute, weak old courtier, and by Russians as something indefinite—a sort of puppet useful only because he had a Russian name.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • And in a history recently written by order of the Highest Authorities it is said that Kutuzov was a cunning court liar, frightened of the name of Napoleon, and that by his blunders at Krasnoe and the Berezina he deprived the Russian army of the glory of complete victory over the French.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • For Russian historians, strange and terrible to say, Napoleon—that most insignificant tool of history who never anywhere, even in exile, showed human dignity—Napoleon is the object of adulation and enthusiasm; he is grand.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • For Russian historians, strange and terrible to say, Napoleon—that most insignificant tool of history who never anywhere, even in exile, showed human dignity—Napoleon is the object of adulation and enthusiasm; he is grand.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (7% in)
  • If so much has been and still is written about the Berezina, on the French side this is only because at the broken bridge across that river the calamities their army had been previously enduring were suddenly concentrated at one moment into a tragic spectacle that remained in every memory, and on the Russian side merely because in Petersburg—far from the seat of war—a plan (again one of Pfuel's) had been devised to catch Napoleon in a strategic trap at the Berezina River.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (16% in)
  • Kutuzov did not understand what Europe, the balance of power, or Napoleon meant.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (20% in)
  • The Italian seemed happy only when he could come to see Pierre, talk with him, tell him about his past, his life at home, and his love, and pour out to him his indignation against the French and especially against Napoleon.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (22% in)
  • "And did you really see and speak to Napoleon, as we have been told?" said Princess Mary.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (30% in)
  • Everybody seems to imagine that being taken prisoner means being Napoleon's guest.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (30% in)
  • "But it's true that you remained in Moscow to kill Napoleon?"
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (30% in)
  • All the well-known people of that period, from Alexander and Napoleon to Madame de Stael, Photius, Schelling, Fichte, Chateaubriand, and the rest, pass before their stern judgment seat and are acquitted or condemned according to whether they conduced to progress or to reaction.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (37% in)
  • Do not the very actions for which the historians praise Alexander I (the liberal attempts at the beginning of his reign, his struggle with Napoleon, the firmness he displayed in 1812 and the campaign of 1813) flow from the same sources—the circumstances of his birth, education, and life—that made his personality what it was and from which the actions for which they blame him (the Holy Alliance, the restoration of Poland, and the reaction of 1820 and later) also flowed?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (37% in)
  • The activity of Alexander or of Napoleon cannot be called useful or harmful, for it is impossible to say for what it was useful or harmful.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (38% in)
  • ...in Austria, in Spain, and in Russia—and that the movements from the west to the east and from the east to the west form the essence and purpose of these events, and not only shall we have no need to see exceptional ability and genius in Napoleon and Alexander, but we shall be unable to consider them to be anything but like other men, and we shall not be obliged to have recourse to chance for an explanation of those small events which made these people what they were, but it will...
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (39% in)
  • By discarding a claim to knowledge of the ultimate purpose, we shall clearly perceive that just as one cannot imagine a blossom or seed for any single plant better suited to it than those it produces, so it is impossible to imagine any two people more completely adapted down to the smallest detail for the purpose they had to fulfill, than Napoleon and Alexander with all their antecedents.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (40% in)
  • It is not Napoleon who prepares himself for the accomplishment of his role, so much as all those round him who prepare him to take on himself the whole responsibility for what is happening and has to happen.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (42% in)
  • The invaders flee, turn back, flee again, and all the chances are now not for Napoleon but always against him.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (42% in)
  • Napoleon himself is no longer of any account; all his actions are evidently pitiful and mean, but again an inexplicable chance occurs.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (42% in)
  • The allies detest Napoleon whom they regard as the cause of their sufferings.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (42% in)
  • What was needed was a sense of justice and a sympathy with European affairs, but a remote sympathy not dulled by petty interests; a moral superiority over those sovereigns of the day who co-operated with him; a mild and attractive personality; and a personal grievance against Napoleon.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (43% in)
  • ...only for his people's welfare, the originator of the liberal innovations in his fatherland—now that he seemed to possess the utmost power and therefore to have the possibility of bringing about the welfare of his peoples—at the time when Napoleon in exile was drawing up childish and mendacious plans of how he would have made mankind happy had he retained power—Alexander I, having fulfilled his mission and feeling the hand of God upon him, suddenly recognizes the insignificance of...
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (43% in)
  • If history had retained the conception of the ancients it would have said that God, to reward or punish his people, gave Napoleon power and directed his will to the fulfillment of the divine ends, and that reply, would have been clear and complete.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (74% in)
  • One might believe or disbelieve in the divine significance of Napoleon, but for anyone believing in it there would have been nothing unintelligible in the history of that period, nor would there have been any contradictions.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (74% in)
  • At that time there was in France a man of genius—Napoleon.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • In Russia there was an Emperor, Alexander, who decided to restore order in Europe and therefore fought against Napoleon.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • Napoleon led six hundred thousand men into Russia and captured Moscow; then he suddenly ran away from Moscow, and the Emperor Alexander, helped by the advice of Stein and others, united Europe to arm against the disturber of its peace.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • All Napoleon's allies suddenly became his enemies and their forces advanced against the fresh forces he raised.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • The Allies defeated Napoleon, entered Paris, forced Napoleon to abdicate, and sent him to the island of Elba, not depriving him of the title of Emperor and showing him every respect, though five years before and one year later they all regarded him as an outlaw and a brigand.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • The Allies defeated Napoleon, entered Paris, forced Napoleon to abdicate, and sent him to the island of Elba, not depriving him of the title of Emperor and showing him every respect, though five years before and one year later they all regarded him as an outlaw and a brigand.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • And Napoleon, shedding tears before his Old Guards, renounced the throne and went into exile.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • Suddenly the diplomatists and monarchs nearly quarreled and were on the point of again ordering their armies to kill one another, but just then Napoleon arrived in France with a battalion, and the French, who had been hating him, immediately all submitted to him.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • And they defeated the genius Napoleon and, suddenly recognizing him as a brigand, sent him to the island of St. Helena.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • To this, modern history laboriously replies either that Napoleon was a great genius, or that Louis XIV was very proud, or that certain writers wrote certain books.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (75% in)
  • In their narration events occur solely by the will of a Napoleon, and Alexander, or in general of the persons they describe.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • One historian says that an event was produced by Napoleon's power, another that it was produced by Alexander's, a third that it was due to the power of some other person.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • Thiers, a Bonapartist, says that Napoleon's power was based on his virtue and genius.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • Gervinus, Schlosser, and others, for instance, at one time prove Napoleon to be a product of the Revolution, of the ideas of 1789 and so forth, and at another plainly say that the campaign of 1812 and other things they do not like were simply the product of Napoleon's misdirected will, and that the very ideas of 1789 were arrested in their development by Napoleon's caprice.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • Gervinus, Schlosser, and others, for instance, at one time prove Napoleon to be a product of the Revolution, of the ideas of 1789 and so forth, and at another plainly say that the campaign of 1812 and other things they do not like were simply the product of Napoleon's misdirected will, and that the very ideas of 1789 were arrested in their development by Napoleon's caprice.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • Gervinus, Schlosser, and others, for instance, at one time prove Napoleon to be a product of the Revolution, of the ideas of 1789 and so forth, and at another plainly say that the campaign of 1812 and other things they do not like were simply the product of Napoleon's misdirected will, and that the very ideas of 1789 were arrested in their development by Napoleon's caprice.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (76% in)
  • The ideas of the Revolution and the general temper of the age produced Napoleon's power.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (77% in)
  • But Napoleon's power suppressed the ideas of the Revolution and the general temper of the age.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (77% in)
  • It is possible to understand that Napoleon had power and so events occurred; with some effort one may even conceive that Napoleon together with other influences was the cause of an event; but how a book, Le Contrat social, had the effect of making Frenchmen begin to drown one another cannot be understood without an explanation of the causal nexus of this new force with the event.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (78% in)
  • It is possible to understand that Napoleon had power and so events occurred; with some effort one may even conceive that Napoleon together with other influences was the cause of an event; but how a book, Le Contrat social, had the effect of making Frenchmen begin to drown one another cannot be understood without an explanation of the causal nexus of this new force with the event.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (78% in)
  • ...for something) the histories of culture, to which all general histories tend more and more to approximate, are significant from the fact that after seriously and minutely examining various religious, philosophic, and political doctrines as causes of events, as soon as they have to describe an actual historic event such as the campaign of 1812 for instance, they involuntarily describe it as resulting from an exercise of power—and say plainly that that was the result of Napoleon's will.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (78% in)
  • But just as doubts of the real value of paper money arise either because, being easy to make, too much of it gets made or because people try to exchange it for gold, so also doubts concerning the real value of such histories arise either because too many of them are written or because in his simplicity of heart someone inquires: by what force did Napoleon do this?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (79% in)
  • We are so accustomed to that idea and have become so used to it that the question: why did six hundred thousand men go to fight when Napoleon uttered certain words, seems to us senseless.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (80% in)
  • This power cannot be based on the predominance of moral strength, for, not to mention heroes such as Napoleon about whose moral qualities opinions differ widely, history shows us that neither a Louis XI nor a Metternich, who ruled over millions of people, had any particular moral qualities, but on the contrary were generally morally weaker than any of the millions they ruled over.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (80% in)
  • If not, then why was Napoleon I?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (81% in)
  • Why was Napoleon III a criminal when he was taken prisoner at Boulogne, and why, later on, were those criminals whom he arrested?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (81% in)
  • Was the will of the Confederation of the Rhine transferred to Napoleon in 1806?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (81% in)
  • Was the will of the Russian people transferred to Napoleon in 1809, when our army in alliance with the French went to fight the Austrians?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (81% in)
  • Equally little does this view explain why for several centuries the collective will is not withdrawn from certain rulers and their heirs, and then suddenly during a period of fifty years is transferred to the Convention, to the Directory, to Napoleon, to Alexander, to Louis XVIII, to Napoleon again, to Charles X, to Louis Philippe, to a Republican government, and to Napoleon III.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (82% in)
  • Equally little does this view explain why for several centuries the collective will is not withdrawn from certain rulers and their heirs, and then suddenly during a period of fifty years is transferred to the Convention, to the Directory, to Napoleon, to Alexander, to Louis XVIII, to Napoleon again, to Charles X, to Louis Philippe, to a Republican government, and to Napoleon III.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (82% in)
  • Equally little does this view explain why for several centuries the collective will is not withdrawn from certain rulers and their heirs, and then suddenly during a period of fifty years is transferred to the Convention, to the Directory, to Napoleon, to Alexander, to Louis XVIII, to Napoleon again, to Charles X, to Louis Philippe, to a Republican government, and to Napoleon III.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (82% in)
  • If the whole activity of the leaders serves as the expression of the people's will, as some historians suppose, then all the details of the court scandals contained in the biographies of a Napoleon or a Catherine serve to express the life of the nation, which is evident nonsense; but if it is only some particular side of the activity of an historical leader which serves to express the people's life, as other so-called "philosophical" historians believe, then to determine which side of...
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (82% in)
  • Is the ferment of the peoples of the west at the end of the eighteenth century and their drive eastward explained by the activity of Louis XIV, XV, and XVI, their mistresses and ministers, and by the lives of Napoleon, Rousseau, Diderot, Beaumarchais, and others?
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (83% in)
  • Napoleon III issues a decree and the French go to Mexico.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (84% in)
  • Napoleon I issues a decree and an army enters Russia.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (84% in)
  • When, for instance, we say that Napoleon ordered armies to go to war, we combine in one simultaneous expression a whole series of consecutive commands dependent one on another.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (85% in)
  • Napoleon could not have commanded an invasion of Russia and never did so.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (85% in)
  • If throughout his reign Napoleon gave commands concerning an invasion of England and expended on no other undertaking so much time and effort, and yet during his whole reign never once attempted to execute that design but undertook an expedition into Russia, with which country he considered it desirable to be in alliance (a conviction he repeatedly expressed)—this came about because his commands did not correspond to the course of events in the first case, but did so correspond in the...
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (85% in)
  • But to know what can and what cannot be executed is impossible, not only in the case of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in which millions participated, but even in the simplest event, for in either case millions of obstacles may arise to prevent its execution.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (86% in)
  • We say that Napoleon wished to invade Russia and invaded it.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (86% in)
  • In reality in all Napoleon's activity we never find anything resembling an expression of that wish, but find a series of orders, or expressions of his will, very variously and indefinitely directed.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (86% in)
  • Amid a long series of unexecuted orders of Napoleon's one series, for the campaign of 1812, was carried out—not because those orders differed in any way from the other, unexecuted orders but because they coincided with the course of events that led the French army into Russia; just as in stencil work this or that figure comes out not because the color was laid on from this side or in that way, but because it was laid on from all sides over the figure cut in the stencil.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (86% in)
  • Whether we speak of the migration of the peoples and the incursions of the barbarians, or of the decrees of Napoleon III, or of someone's action an hour ago in choosing one direction out of several for his walk, we are unconscious of any contradiction.
    Book Fifteen — 1812-13 (92% in)

There are no more uses of "Napoleon Bonaparte" in War and Peace.

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